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ABSTRACT 
It is known that "human error" is the primary cause of the majority of incidents occurring in 
process activities. Such incidents can lead to unacceptable outcomes. Each year, there are 
billions of dollars lost and many injuries/deaths occurring as a result of human error which 
could have been avoided. Human factors play an important role in causation of these human 
errors leading to losses. Human factor is the information about human characteristics and 
behavior controlling human performance. Human errors are inevitable due to the noticeable 
role of human in operation, maintenance, analysis, decision making, and expert judgments, 
particularly in complex systems. To reduce the human error, the methods of Human Error 
Probabilities (HEPs) have been identified. Each technique has its own advantages and 
disadvantages and may need to be tailored for use within a specific scenario. The focus of this 
research is to develop comprehensive methodologies to estimate the HEPs in pre and post-
maintenance procedures of process facilities. It also develops a risk-based methodology to 
investigate the reliability of human performance in harsh and cold environments. The methods 
"Success Likelihood Index Method (SLIM) and Human Error Assessment and Reduction 
Technique (HEART) HEART" have been used for this purpose. Using HEART methodology, 
the HEP in different scenarios in an offshore platform is estimated. Also, the high-risk activities 
in pre and post maintenance of process equipment are identified and the HEPs are reduced 
through a risk-based decision- making methodology. 
SLI methodology is used to calculate the HEP of the procedures for removmg process 
components from service and returning the equipment to service as a possible failure scenario. 
Consequences and the individual risks are assessed for each component, and then the overall 
11 
risk is estimated by adding these individual risks. Also, the HEP is assessed by integrating the 
SLIM with the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) to generate the nominal 
HEP data when sufficient information is not available. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
The human factor plays an important role in the safe operation of process facilities. Hence, 
information about human capacities and behaviors should be applied systematically to risk 
analysis and safety assessment. Many models are available to estimate human error probability 
(HEP). However identifying an appropriate technique for specific operational conditions 
remains a challenge. Each HEP technique has its own advantages and disadvantages and may 
need to be tailored for use within a specific scenario. 
Human error in offshore facility has been investigated by different researchers in the last 
decades and as a result, many methods have been developed to calculate the HEPs. Among all 
the methods, Success Likelihood Index Method (SLIM) and Human Error Assessment and 
Reduction Technique (HEART) methodologies are the most comprehensive and highly flexible 
methods in human reliability assessment. These two methods have been considered in this 
research to calculate the HEPs to measure the risk. Consequently, risk reduction measures were 
considered to prioritize and minimize the risk. A risk-based approach is applied to offshore 
process facilities to investigate the role of human error in pre- and post-maintenance 
procedures. In the context of risk-based maintenance, the main focus has been on the 
application of risk as a tool to prioritize or optimize the maintenance plan and schedule which 
consequently helps to reduce the overall risk. This study is aimed at illustrating the role of 
human error in maintenance, which is likely to make a significant contribution to the overall 
risk by endangering the safety of the facility. 
1.2 The role of Human Error in Risk Analysis 
Human error includes people's mental and physical abilities and limitations and the effect they 
have on a system's performance, equipment and design. Human engineering, or the inclusion of 
1 
human factors, should be taken into account when thinking about how machines and systems 
are designed, operated, and maintained. This study will use a system approach as a 
methodology to the topic. Also, the application of the methodology is illustrated via case 
studies while directions for future research are discussed. 
Human errors are often the result of improper implementation of strategies and poor 
management and supervlSlon, with supervisors encouragmg workers to find short cuts to 
increase productivity, often leading to harmful errors. Regardless of whether an individual can 
provide a rational for committing an error that resulted in unwanted consequences, it should be 
considered an error; however, the efforts made to stop errors from occurring are often hindered 
by the lack of a consensus of what actually should be considered a human error. 
Incorporating HEPs in the development of operational procedures can significantly improve the 
overall reliability of the system. There have been efforts to assess HEPs using the 
aforementioned methods as part of risk analysis. 
Different approaches are used in risk analysis such as Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) and 
Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) to identify major hazards and risks of potential accident 
scenarios. These approaches are being applied to improve the level of safety in aerospace, 
nuclear, and chemical process facilities. The result of risk analysis is normally considered by 
decision-makers and safety experts to improve the performance of safety measures in a facility 
for the risk being within an acceptable range. Risk analysis techniques have been integrated 
into design, inspection, and maintenance scheduling of process systems, resulting in risk-based 
design of safety measures, risk-based design of process systems and risk-based inspection and 
maintenance. 
2 
The estimation of risk resulting from human error in a specific scenario is considered. Several 
techniques are available for accident scenario modeling such as Fault Tree (FT), Event Tree 
(ET), and Bow-Tie (BT). ET has widely been used to explore the probability of consequences 
resulted from an initiating event. Considering the initiating event, the occurrence probability of 
each consequence is calculated based on the occurrence/nonoccurrence of a set of events or 
success/failure of components. 
The methodology developed in this research can be applied to maintenance procedures of any 
equipment or process facility onshore and offshore. This would help to better understand the 
role ofHEP in risk analysis and consequently to increase the overall reliability and safety of the 
process system. 
1.3 Human Error Probability Assessment Techniques 
The study of human factors is an important area of safety and risk engineering and it 
includes the systematic application of information about human characteristics and 
behavior to improve the performance of human-machine systems (McSweeney et al., 2008). 
HEP has predominantly been a focus of the nuclear power industry through the 
development of expert judgment techniques such as SLIM and the Technique for Human 
Error Rate Prediction (THERP) (Swain et al., 1983). 
The goals of HEP estimationare 
(Skelton, 1997): 
• Preventing of death or injury of the workers 
• Preventing of death or injury to the general public 
• A voiding damage to a plant 
• Stopping any harmful effects on the environment 
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• Preventing damage to third parties 
Therefore, incorporating HEP and related human operations and procedures in the facilities 
should improve reliability of the overall systems (Swain et al. , 1983). 
Several studies (Apostolakis et al., 1988; Kirwan and James, 1989; Zamanali et al., 1998) 
have compared different methods (e.g. SLIM, HEART and THERP) for finding HEP. These 
studies report both the advantages and disadvantages of these techniques with respect to 
HEP under various scenarios (Stanton et al., 2002; Salmon et al., 2003; Park et al., 2008). 
Thus, a thorough review of each technique is required. 
Analytic Hierarchy Process ( AHP) (Saaty, 1980) can be used for comparing among the 
alternative HEP methods using multiple-criteria. The AHP has three important components 
(Alidi, 1996): 
• Structuring the problem into a hierarchy which includes a goal and subordinate 
features (decomposition) 
• Pair-wise comparison among elements in each level (evaluation) 
• Propagation oflevel specific, local priorities to global priorities (synthesis) 
In these components, subordinates level of hierarchy may consist of objectives, scenarios, 
events, actions, outcomes and alternatives. Pair-wise comparisons are done for various 
components in each level considering the elements in the higher level. Comparing these 
components may be done as preference, importance and likelihood. 
There are different techniques available to estimate HEP, not all of which are usable for 
different scenarios. Therefore, one needs to be familiar with the advantages and 
disadvantages of each technique based on previous investigations to select the suitable 
methodology for the specific case. SLIM is one of the most flexible techniques, based on 
presumably independent Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs). However, it is difficult to 
4 
ensure whether these PSFs are independent. HEART is a quick and simple technique to use 
with little investigator training, although the reliability of the method is yet not proven. 
Moreover, the lack of existing validation studies and its high dependency on expert opinions 
are some of the HEART's limitations. THEARP was claimed as one of the most precise 
techniques to determine HEP, but it is not useful in error reduction and is highly dependent 
on the assessors. Therefore, choosing the specific level by the assessors may lead to 
different results. Absolute Probability Judgment (APJ) is another technique to obtain HEP 
for specific applications. The expert discussion used in this technique helps to quantify and 
qualify the HEPs. APJ is to some extent prone to certain biases as well as personality/group 
problems and conflicts. Paired Comparisons (PC) is another technique that can reveal the 
relative importance of different human errors and quickly estimate the HEPs. However, 
this method is not suitable for complex predictions of human error. The homogeneity of the 
events is an assumption in this technique that could be subject to error. Finally, in 
Predictive Human Error Analysis ( PHEA) technique, error reduction strategies are 
offered as part of the analysis, in addition to error prediction. However, this technique 
does not model cognitive components of error mechanism. As evident from above 
discussion, each technique has its own advantages and disadvantages and may need to be 
tailored for use within a specific scenario. 
1.4 Motivation 
The study of human factors is an important area in risk analysis of process systems. It 
includes the systematic application of information about human characteristics and 
behavior to improve the performance of human-machine systems and to increase the safety of 
the process. Over the last few years, a number of major accidents occurred in different 
industries as a result of human errors in operation, analysis, and decision-making .. 
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Therefore, studies have been devoted to analyze the factors contributing to human errors in 
specific scenarios in order to reduce the human error. Researchers and industry have been 
attempting to decrease human error by changing equipment or process, changing procedure or 
changing management system. However, most of these attempts have neither studied the 
human factors in a systematic manner nor recognized the role of human error in risk analysis 
and decision-making. 
The present research is aimed at developing an engineering framework to identify human error 
in the risk analysis of process facilities, and to reduce its contribution to the risk through 
improved risk-based decision-making. 
1.5 Organization of the thesis 
This thesis is written in manuscript format (paper based) and is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 discusses the novelties and contributions this thesis has made in safety and risk 
assessment and of human performance in different environments. It comprises innovative 
applications of HEP methods in QRA, a new methodology to assess the HEPs in maintenance 
procedures, and estimate the HEP in harsh and cold environments 
Chapter 3 presents the literature review. The literature review reports on human error 
identification methods, risk analysis, and the role of human error m different process 
operations. 
Chapter 4 is devoted to HEP evaluation methodologies. This chapter provides evaluation of 
some of the most suitable techniques for HEPs and compares these techniques based on 
their applicability and limitations in process systems. This content of this chapter was 
6 
presented at the National Conference on Safety Engineering & HSE Management at Sharif 
University ofTechnology in March 2010 (http://www.cpsl.ir/index_e.aspx). 
Chapter 5 proposes a new methodology to assess the HEPs in maintenance procedures. This 
research provides an analysis of human factors in pre- and post- maintenance of pumps by 
using the HEART methodology. This chapter is published by Process Safety and 
Environmental Protection (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2012.11.003). 
In Chapter 6, the SLIM is integrated with the THERP to generate the nominal HEP data when it 
is unavailable. Also, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tools have been utilized to re-
quantify the HEPs. This chapter is submitted to Reliability Engineering and Safety System. 
Chapter 7 discusses the differences between the HEPs and related risk in normal and cold 
conditions, by using HEART methodology. This methodology is applied to the post-
maintenance tasks of a pump in offshore oil and gas facility. This chapter is accepted for 
publication in the Journal of Human Factors. 
Chapter 8 presents another systematic application of human characteristics and behavior to 
increase the safety of a process system. The HEP is calculated for each activity using the SLIM. 
This chapter is submitted to the Journal of Reliability Engineering and Safety System. 
Chapter 9 presents the summery of the thesis and the main conclusions drawn through this 
work. Recommendations for future work are presented towards the end of the chapter. 
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2 Novelty and contribution 
2.1 Overview 
The novelties and contributions of this work are classified into three categories: 
• Application of human error probabilities methods to quantitative risk analysis. 
• A new methodology to assess the HEPs in maintenance procedures. 
• A new methodology to estimate the HEP in harsh and cold environments. 
In this chapter, these novelties are briefly explained while the details are presented in the 
relevant chapters. 
2.2 Application of HEP methods in QRA 
A risk-based methodology is developed to assess the human factor risk in offshore pre- and 
post- maintenance procedure. The HEPs are estimated by applying the SLIM process. After 
obtaining the HEPs based on a specific scenario, the final value of the risk is calculated by 
integrating the HEPs and consequence analysis outcomes. If the risk exceeds predefined 
acceptable criteria, it will be reduced through either implementation of additional safety 
barriers or improving the performance of existing safety measures. HEP reduction can also be 
accomplished through re-designing the activities. This contribution is drawn from Chapters 8. 
2.3 A new methodology to assess the HEPs in maintenance procedures 
A risk-based methodology is developed to assess the risks of human errors in maintenance 
activities. The HEPs are estimated by applying the HEART process. After obtaining the HEPs 
based on a described work activity or scenario, the final value of the risk is calculated by 
integrating both the HEPs and the consequence analysis results. Whenever the calculated risk 
exceeds acceptable criteria that are based on specified guidelines, then a risk management 
approach is employed to minimize the risk. This contribution is discussed in Chapter 5. 
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2.4 A new methodology to estimate the HEP in harsh and cold environments 
To demonstrate the variation in HEPs, a new methodology is developed applicable in 
harsh and cold environments. This methodology is build upon revisions of the HEART 
methodology to accentuate the human activities in harsh and cold environments. It is applied to 
post-maintenance procedures of a condensate pump in offshore oil and gas facility. The 
scenarios were selected based on maintenance reports of an offshore platform. Then, the most 
frequently occurring scenario in the facility was selected to implement the methodology. 
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3 Literature review 
3.1 Human Error 
Human error is considered a part of everyday functioning and it is expected that people 
will make errors; they are some of the most undesirable aspects of daily life. Human error takes 
the shape of human behavior that can be considered undesirable, unacceptable and shows a lack 
of attentiveness. Although many errors are often detected and corrected before causing harm, 
and are often a way of predicting future problems, human errors are the cause of 50 to 90% of 
all accidents, the result of which can have long term consequences. However, human errors can 
be better dealt with and tolerated in terms of the design and manufacturing of mass-produced 
products through attempts to produce systems and processes that are complex, industrial and 
professional in nature. 
Human failure and human fault all refer to different concepts; however it is necessary to 
differentiate them to minimize their harm. "Human fault" on the other hand, indicates a sense 
of blame, with errors being caused due to negligent or intentional behavior that is often 
punishable. To a further extent "human failure" indicates a massive error that has far reaching 
consequences that are often moral in nature and is often entirely inexcusable. An understanding 
of raw data, relevant data, and productive data and what differentiates them is important to 
understanding these concepts. In a recent study done on the problems, defects and process 
errors seen in a chemical plant, five main sources were found as the cause of these problems 
with the failure to follow standard procedures and stay within proper operational discipline 
being the main cause of human errors. 
This, together with the second most common source of errors, that is the inability to follow 
proper operational practices, such as regular and necessary inspections, repairs, and 
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modifications of equipment, accounted for 63% of the problems seen. These human errors can 
often be avoided by addressing system design defects and make sure workers have the proper 
knowledge and training methods. The effect of human factors on system design and the debate 
on whether to view from an operation perspective will be the focus of the proposed research. 
The role of managers and engineers and how they assess human factor issues is also highly 
important, as changes cannot be made if these key players fail to acknowledge human factors 
issues when dealing with problems related to cost and delays in a project's progress. 
This importance placed on human error is understandable, considering that it is such a 
major cause of accidents and potential negative consequences in areas such as nuclear power 
and other complex technological sectors. To deal with this problem, the probability of human 
error needs to be strictly monitored for its potential effect on system failure, and the means to 
effectively manage and reduce failure (error) rates while people learn from their mistakes is 
necessary. With the implementation of these strategies it is necessary to include the available 
data on modem technological systems and their relationships with human errors in order to 
determine their probability. New approaches need to be suggested based on error state 
exclusion and systematic learning to find out how to properly manage the incidence of human 
error as well as safety indicators. 
The kinds of responses to and treatments of human error differ depending on the 
undesirable consequences, which occur as a result. Norman (1981) and Reason (1990) an 
"error" occurs in situations where an act is committed both intentionally and unintentionally, 
however, the error itself and the original intention of the act are often viewed separately. 
Actions, which have not succeeded as planned, are often attributed to errors as a result of 
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unintentional actions, whereas actions that were carried out as planned or intended yet didn't 
achieve their results are seen as being erroneous in their original actions. 
Regardless of the intention, the occurrence of undesired outcomes is clearly the 
common factor here; however, unwanted outcomes do not necessarily indicate negative results, 
as the results of human errors sometimes occurs or can only be seen at a later time. Undesired 
outcomes may also refer to outcomes which did not have a negative effect, but still had the 
potential to. The treatment of errors should depend more on a recognition that an error actually 
occurred rather than the outcome of what actually has occurred as a result of an action. 
The intentional violation of a procedure does not fall under the definition of a human 
error; however, when potentially dangerous outcomes occur as a result, these types of actions 
are considered human errors. The exploratory attitude, part of a formal training program with 
results in unintentional actions, should not be considered as falling under the definition of 
human error. The need to encourage adaptation and creatively developing skills to improve on 
mistakes and promote learning is what should be stressed in the context of human errors. 
Hollnagel (1993), for example, shows one such divergent opmwn, usmg the term 
"erroneous actions", which he indicates is "an action which fails to produce the expected result 
and which therefore leads to an unwanted consequence". 
According to Dekker (2005) the view of errors as "ex post facto constructs rather than 
as objective, observed facts". In other words the predisposition for the bias including the 
people, who have been participated, investigated and had imposed their knowledge and future 
expectations. The observers do not bring us near to understand the experience in the real 
situation for which there is no error-"the error only exists by virtue of the observer and his or 
her position on the outside of the stream of experience." 
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Dekker (2005) views the perspective of what is an error as influenced by personal knowledge 
and experience, with these personal ideals determining errors as "ex post facto constructs rather 
than as objective, observed facts." 
Sanders and McCormick (1993), view human errors as inappropriate decisions that have 
a negative effect on system safety effectiveness and performance. Sanders and McCormick also 
argue that providing a classification system can help to organize human error data and provide 
insight into how errors can be prevented. Lawton and Parker (1998) provide one such system, 
placing human errors into two categories, "non-intentional errors" which are often related to 
human cognitive errors and the inability of humans to function perfectly in terms of both 
information processing and short-term memory and "violations" which are intentional 
deviations from proper safety procedures, which are the result of both psychological and social 
factors. The occurrence of violations, according to Atkinson (1998), are at least partially caused 
by tendency of people to put in as little effort as possible as well as an indifferent workplace. 
Several studies have determined that such errors are a major cause of accidents in construction 
(Suraji et al. , 2001) and manufacturing (DuPont Safety Resources, 2000; Lawton and Parker, 
1998; Rasmussen et al., 1994; Sanders and McCormick, 1993). The actual participation of 
human error as a causal factor is more difficult to determine, however, as it ranges from percent 
(Suraji et al. , 2001) to 96 percent (DuPont Safety Resources, 2000) the wide range possibly 
being determined by finding the root cause of such accidents. Determining these root causes is 
difficult, however, as it depends greatly on the opinion and discretion of the analyst. Such 
investigations to determine the cause of these events are often interrupted or stopped when an 
explanation or cure is found or ifthere is simply a lack of information (Rasmussen et al. , 1994). 
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It is very unlikely, however, that human errors will ever be eliminated entirely, 
however, as people demonstrate continuously adaptive behaviors in dynamic work systems and 
the regular enforcement of rules designed to limit human errors are often limited due to 
financial and time restrictions (Rasmussen 1997). As a result, workers may be encouraged to 
simply work in a manner in which they barely avoid causing accidents and often are forced to 
work in risky conditions (Rasmussen, 1997). To control this problem, Rasmussen et al. (1994) 
suggest that clear and determined boundaries should be set in an attempt to minimize human 
errors when designing work systems, and should be set in an environment which they are 
respected and error-tolerant (Rasmussen et al., 1994). 
3.2 Risk assessment 
Many techniques and methodologies have been proposed since the 70's for risk assessment 
(Khan & Abbasi, 1998). Quantitative and qualitative risk assessments are two types of the risk 
evaluation system (Ferdous, 2007). Qualitative risk assessment is mostly used to identify the 
hazards associated with a process and it is usually used as a preparation step for consequence 
analysis (Hauptmanns, 1988; Lees, 1996). Quantitative risk assessment analyses system risk in 
terms of numerical evaluation of consequence and occurrence probability of an unwanted 
event. 
Risk analysis approaches such as QRA and PSA have widely been applied to identify major 
hazards and risks of accident scenarios and also to improve the level of safety in aerospace, 
nuclear, and chemical process facilities. The result of risk analysis is normally considered by 
decision-makers to decide the plans of reasonable levels of risk or by safety experts to improve 
the performance of safety measures in a facility to reduce the risk to an acceptable range. 
Further, in the recent decade, risk assessment techniques have been integrated into design, 
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inspection, and maintenance scheduling of process systems, resulting in risk-based design of 
safety measures (Piccinini and Demichela, 2008; Khakzad et al. , 201 1), risk-based design of 
process systems (Demichela and Piccinini, 2004; Khakzad et al., 2013) and risk-based 
inspection and maintenance (Apeland and Aven, 2000; Khan and Haddara, 2003; Khan et al, 
2004; Khan and Haddara, 2004). In the context of risk-based maintenance, the main focus has 
been on the application of risk as a tool to prioritize or optimize the maintenance plans and 
schedules which consequently helps to reduce the overall risk. 
3.3 Human Error in different process operation 
Estimation of the HEP has been done in the emergency situation m order to assess the 
contribution of the operator error to major accident likelihood. To perform the requested action 
correctly by an operator in an emergency situation, the human performance is dependent of the 
available time. In different scenarios the amount of time required for an operator to act 
appropriately without loss of containment were estimated over a period of time. (Claudio 
Nespoli and Sabatino Ditali, 2010). 
Taking care to limit probable mistakes m different functions and ensunng reasonable 
performance of various parts of systems in compliance with determined goals are some of the 
specific goals of human-machine systems. More complex systems need more resources for their 
maintenance and keeping their specified functions. Since maintenance of systems with a 
suitable standard and in accordance with specified goals requires resources, therefore any 
reduction of costs through relevant considerations is vital. 
Therefore those who are involved in maintenance & repair of systems should have some special 
qualities like judgment and analysis of their work under these special conditions. Good 
knowledge about their professional requires and specifications are a natural condition for their 
confident functioning in the concerned system. 
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For anyone, in any circumstances it is possible to make different mistakes. Most accidents are 
related to human mistakes, the weak design of a system or machine failure. A system that 
makes the operator apply their maximum physical and mental capacities may put him at risk of 
further mistakes. 
A common proverb about the repair and maintenance of systems says "If it isn't broken, don't 
fix it". But fortunately today this idea is rejected. There is another proverb about repair 
instructions that says as "A stitch in time saves nine". That means an on-time repair may 
prevent a further repairs. Therefore we have four following sections in repairs & maintenance 
affairs (Dhillon, 2002): 
1- Preventive Maintenance 
2- Predictive Maintenance 
3- Corrective Maintenance 
4- Over Haul 
Preventive maintenance means regular visits of components including different systems and 
machinery to assess the oil, voice, temperature, vibration and other factors (depending upon the 
type of unit) and repairing difficulties before any damages and disorders in utilization 
functions. As a result it is very important and useful to have regular sheet and daily time tables 
based upon relevant experiences of repair specialists, specifically the instructions of 
manufacturers, and inserting the daily checking bill in it. It is more effective to have repair files 
for all machines and systems, and registration of the relevant technical specifications, and 
partial repairing works in fault finding process. 
Predictive maintenance means displaying & registering systems for controlling problematic 
factors such as vibration, temperature, pressure and other physical /chemical quantities required 
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for estimation of machinery and systems. It is also known as monitoring. It is necessary to be 
ensured about the correct efficiency of measuring systems and their periodic regulation and 
calibration. 
Corrective maintenance means any recognition of different factors which may cause further 
problems along with removing them by corrective methods. Modification & Improvement 
functions are also in parallel with corrective maintenance. Therefore it is more effective to bear 
a powerful Technical I Engineering unit for this purpose. 
Fundamental or Programmed repairs involve dismantling all parts of constructions for further 
inspection; evaluation and troubleshooting were hidden from the view of the operator and from 
further repairs. Also overhaul may include any replacement of expired parts and a general 
cleaning of a system within specified periods. 
Dhillon (2006) review literatures to understand the importance of human error in maintenance, 
the occurrence of maintenance errors results for many reasons, such as poor design factors 
including issues involving equipment, maintenance, and work layout, and difficulties faced by 
workers, such as improper work tools, fatigue on overstressed workers and environmental 
factors, such as humidity, lighting, temperature, etc. Lastly, improper training, the use of 
outdated maintenance manuals and a lack of proper experience contribute to high numbers of 
maintenance errors. Improving the work environment and practices by taking these factors into 
account, such as providing more experience, ensuring emotional stability and hiring workers 
who have a greater aptitude for their environment reported less fatigue and more satisfaction, 
improving team work and boosting morale. 
As mentioned above, human errors can impact safety and performance in various ways. 
One prominent example is how the number of breakdowns due to poor repairs can potentially 
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mcrease the risks associated with equipment failure and a rise in personal accidents. The 
Human factor m reliability group has recognized how human factors' interaction with 
maintenance operations can potentially lead to safety hazards. This group, however, provides 
limited guidance for managers and engineers to attempt to address these various safety issues. 
This group has attempted to determine the roles that safety and reliability play in regards to 
maintenance errors by studying their own organization by applying methods aimed at reducing 
these types of errors in their own workplace through practical means. In an attempt to reduce 
human errors in maintenance operations, managers and other group members created a guide 
which identifies 18 factors which need to be addressed and means of identifying and dealing 
with these problem areas, which has recently been published by the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) and can potentially be of great value to the Aviation Industry. 
Although human errors in maintenance have not received much academic attention, it 
has recently been found that most human errors occur in the maintenance phase and 
maintenance workers clearly have an important role in keeping equipment workable and 
reliable. One such study focuses on various literatures that has been published on the topic and 
can be potentially beneficial for the maintenance engineering field. A survey conducted by 
Pekkarinen et al. (1993) studied the amount of risk facing maintenance workers during a period 
when a chemical plant was shut down to help improve maintenance policies. Nelson (1996) 
argued that accident occurrence due to maintenance activities as well as over speed protection 
equipment should be a cause for concern in this industry. Balkey (1996), however, asserted that 
risk based inspection procedures and human error procedures in fossil fuel plants must be taken 
into account when conducting inspection procedures. Further data is contributed by Eves' 
(1985) report on accidents which occurred in the chemical manufacturing industry during times 
of maintenance. 
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Raman et al. (1991) contributed guidelines to apply Hazop techniques in the application of 
maintenance procedures conducted on offshore oil and gas platforms, while Underwood 
( 1991 )examine the effect of safety systems in the chemical industry through inspecting various 
case studies on the topic. Further research has been done by Dhillon and Yang (1995) who 
developed a new stochastic model to analyze the rates in human error and failed system repairs 
and how they affected reliability and availability of the machines. After examining the ratio 
estimation of HEP, Park and Jung (1996) suggested that, through linear transformation, and 
simple techniques of converting ratios, they can determine objective HEP. Further studies were 
done by Anderson et al. (1998) on reduced manning and how it affects the types of human 
errors experienced in systems operations and maintenance. Finally, Mcroy (1998) concluded 
that collecting samples of the different types of errors and interactions one experiences can be 
helpful in preventing such errors. 
Jacob et al. (1997), in their analysis, found that critical human errors were a common 
cause for failure as a result of repairs done on two unit standby systems. Similarly, Sur and 
Sarkar (1996) found that redundant systems regularly caused human errors and logic failure 
makes a probabilistic model. Four such probabilistic models were developed by Dhillon and 
Rayapati (1988b) who used supplementary variables method to develop system availability 
expressions represented by the human errors found in two unit parallel and standby redundant 
systems. These two researchers also studied standby redundant systems and human error using 
three stochastic models. 
Further studies have been conducted on the topic of systems failures and human errors 
by Sridharan and Mohanavadivu (1997), who studied three Markov models of two non-
identical unit parallel systems, Narmada and Jacob (1996) who used a stochastic model 
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representing a three unit system and Dhillon (1989) who analyzed repairable and non-
repairable redundant systems and human errors, establishing a reliability analysis. A basic, but 
useful, study was done by Reason (1990) who gave an overview of basic error mechanisms and 
what types of errors occur. In an attempt to deal with the problem of human error, Su et al. 
(2000) suggested using a knowledge-based system to analyze cognitive types and enhance fault 
recovery ability using a practical framework, while Gupta et al. (1991) examined overloading 
effects and critical human error during repair waiting times in a multi-component parallel 
system. 
Chung (1987) examined human error and common-cause failures using a repairable 
parallel system with standby units. The existence of human error in the form of fault injection 
was studied by Carr and Christer (2003) who used data on these phenomena to extend the 
mathematics model of delay-time of inspection maintenance during the inspection process. 
Ramalhoto ( 1999) outlined critical safety measures after studying maintenance personnel, while 
Vaurio (1995), in an attempt to address human errors and common cause failures, supplied a 
procedure that could be used in various situations to ensure proper maintenance and safety tests 
for certain systems as well as reviewed some earlier models which attempted to address HEPs 
in a separate article. Human analysis and repair times in a system were researched by Dhillon 
and Yang (1993), while Sanders and McCormick (1993) outlined the types of human factors 
which can contribute to errors in maintenance in direct or indirect ways. Bradley presented a 
methodology which can be useful in helping determine the causes of human, design and 
maintenance errors. Miller and Swain (1986) examined the effects ofhuman errors on system 
performance, equipment or task characteristics and work potential, and how they can be 
changed to reduce these errors. In an earlier study, Dhillon (1986) outlined the various aspects 
present with regards to human factors and maintenance, such as reliability and error, revisiting 
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the topic in a 2002 book. Gramopadhye and Drury (2000) gave their theories behind the 
increases in maintenance and inspection errors, while Dodson and Nolan (1999) examined the 
human factors behind field tests, production and man-machine function allocation. 
3.4 Human error quantification methods 
The study of human factors is an important area of process engineering and it includes the 
systematic application of information about human characteristics and behavior to improve 
the performance of human-machine systems (McSweeney et al., 2008). HEP has 
predominantly been a focus of the nuclear power industry through the development of 
expert judgment techniques such as SLIM and the THERP (Swain et al., 1983). 
The goal ofHEP is (Skelton, 1997): 
• Preventing of death or injury of the workers 
• Preventing of death or injury to the general public 
• A voiding damage to a plant 
• Stopping any harmful effects on the environment 
• Preventing damage to third parties 
Therefore, incorporating HEP and related human operations and procedures in the facilities 
should improve reliability of the overall systems (Swain et al. , 1983). 
Several studies (Apostolakis et al., 1988; Kirwan and James, 1989; Zamanali et al., 1998; 
Spurgin and Lydell, 2002) have compared different methods (e.g. SLIM, HEART and 
THERP) for finding HEP. These studies report both the advantages and disadvantages of 
these techniques with respect to HEP under various scenarios (Stanton et al., 2002; Salmon 
et al., 2003; Park et al. , 2008). Thus, a thorough review of each technique is required. 
There is no single metric or approach to compare for comparing between the alternative HEP 
methods. The AHP (Saaty, 1980) can help with multiple-criteria decisions. The AHP has 
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three important components (Alidi, 1996): 
• Structuring the problem into a hierarchy which includes a goal and subordinate features 
(decomposition) 
• Pair-wise comparison among elements in each level (evaluation) 
• Propagation oflevel specific, local priorities to global priorities (synthesis) 
In these components, subordinates level of hierarchy may consist of objectives, scenanos, 
events, actions, outcomes and alternatives. Pair-wise compansons are done for various 
components in each level considering the elements in the higher level. Comparing these 
components may be done as preference, importance and likelihood. 
There has been some degree of research applied to the quantification ofHEPs, however only a 
few of these techniques have been used in practical risk assessments (Embrey et al. , 1984). 
3.5 Advanced approaches of human error analysis 
The advances in science and technology, made the man-machine system to become more and 
more reliable and therefore the operation error of human being becomes more and more severe. 
The human reliability analysis (HRA) has become an essential content of probability safety 
analysis in the man-machine system. In order to estimate the HEP, various models were 
introduced including the key performance shaping factor, error correction capability factor, the 
human operation action error model and operation mission reliability model. These models 
studied the characteristics of the operator behavior responsible for error, such as human 
perception ability, judgment, decision-making, and the operation action ability. Human 
reliability analysis was done using the ET analysis method. Considering the dynamic 
characteristics of human error, time sequence and the ability of error correction, there are some 
limitations in human reliability analysis. To overcome this limitation, the dynamic Bayesian 
networks theory was carried out which is the qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis of 
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human operation action reliability in the complex man-machine system. The method of 
transform human error ET into dynamic Bayesian network was provided by Luyun Chen et al. 
(2012). There are three categories of human factor barrier failure (HFBF), which includes 
individual factor barrier failure (IFBF), organizational factor barrier failure (OFBF) and group 
factor barrier failure (GFBF). Pseudo-FT is used to illustrate the human factors. It is an 
incorporation of the intermediate options into FT in order to eliminate the binary restriction. 
The dynamic Bayesian networks were applied in quantitative risk assessment of human factors 
on offshore platforms. A method was defined to translate the pseudo-FT into Bayesian 
networks. This methodology confirmed that within the first two weeks, the human error barrier 
failure increases and if the repair is considered, it reaches a stable level, whereas it increases 
continuously when the repair action is not considered (Baoping Cai et al. , 2013). 
Human error has been identified as an important factor for many offshore and onshore 
accidents occurrence. Literature review revealed that there is very little data available in human 
error, which could be secondary to lapses in historical database registry methodology. HRA has 
been used to estimate the probability that an operator will perform a task in a reasonable time 
without degrading the system. The Research proposed in Brazil a methodology that HRA 
should be able to be performed even with shortage of related human error statistical data. PSFs 
were also evaluated in order to estimate their influence level onto the operator's actions. Both 
HEP estimation and PSF evaluation were done based on expert judgment using interviews and 
questionnaires. Group evaluation values obtained by using Fuzzy Logic and Fuzzy Set theory. 
HEP results were in good agreement with literature published data corroborating the proposed 
methodology as a good alternative to be used on HRA (C.S. do Nascimento and R.N. de 
Mesquita, 201 2). 
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Traditional HEP studies were based on fuzzy number concepts, so it was useful only when the 
lack of data exists. It could not be applied to situations where experts have adequate 
information. A novel HEP assessment is also proposed by usmg data combination, 
defuzzification and transformation processes. In this methodology a test case consisting of three 
different scenarios were used. In these scenarios, the fuzzy data are close to each other. The 
outcomes are compared with the results achieved from the traditional fuzzy HEP studies using 
the same test case. This methodology is capable of providing reasonable results in both 
situations when the lack of data exists and also when the required data is available (Shuen-Tai 
Ung, Wei-Min, 20ll).The case study was done on the accident at the Chemobyl nuclear power 
plant which showed that fuzzy reliability analysis gives information from more points of view 
than probabilistic analysis (Takehisa Onisawa and Yasushi Nishiwaki, 1988). 
The conventional fault tree analysis (FT A) is used for estimation of exact probabilities of 
occurrence of system failure, which found to be very difficult when fault events are imprecise 
such as human error. A fuzzy FT A model employing fuzzy sets and possibility theory is 
proposed to tackle this problem (Nang-Fei Pan Nat et al, 2007). 
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Preface 
Comparative Evaluation of Human Error Probability 
Assessment Techniquest 
A version of this manuscript has been presented in the National Conference on Safety 
Engineering & HSE Management at Sharif University of Technology in March 2010. Noroozi 
was the main lead on the work. The co-authors, Drs. Khan and MacKinnon supervised the work 
and helped to develop the methodology. The co-author Dr. Abbassi helped gathering the 
different methodologies. Noroozi assessed HEP techniques while Drs. Khan and MacKinnon 
reviewed the manuscript and provided the necessary suggestions. 
Abstract 
Many models are available to estimate HEP. However identifying an appropriate 
technique for the specific operational conditions remains a challenge. Each technique has 
its own advantages and disadvantages and may need to be tailored for use within a specific 
scenario. This research provides evaluation some of the most suitable techniques for 
HEPs and evaluates these techniques based on their applicability and limitations in 
process systems. The AHP is used to do a comparative analysis. Based on AHP, the 
SLIM was selected to obtain HEPs for an emergency building evacuation scenario. 
Keywords: Human error, HEP, AHP, SLIM 
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4.1 Introduction 
The study of human factors is an important area of process engineering and it includes the 
systematic application of information about human characteristics and behavior to improve 
the performance of human-machine systems (McSweeney et al., 2008). HEP has 
predominantly been a focus of the nuclear power industry through the development of 
expert judgment techniques such as SLIM and the THERP (Swain et al. , 1983). 
The goal of HEP is (Skelton, 1997): 
• Preventing of death or injury of the workers 
• Preventing of death or injury to the general public 
• A voiding damage to a plant 
• Stopping any harmful effects on the environment 
• Preventing damage to third parties 
Therefore, incorporating HEP and related human operations and procedures in the facilities 
should improve reliability of the overall systems (Swain et al., 1983). 
Several studies (Apostolakis et al., 1988; Kirwan and James, 1989; Zamanali et al., 1998; 
Spurgin and Lydell, 2002) have compared different methods (e.g. SLIM, HEART and 
THERP) for finding HEP. These studies report both the advantages and disadvantages of 
these techniques with respect to HEP under various scenarios (Stanton et al., 2002; 
Salmon et al., 2003; Park et al., 2008). Thus, a thorough review of each technique is 
required. 
There is no single metric or approach to compare for comparing between the alternative 
HEP methods. The AHP (Saaty, 1980) can help with multiple-criteria decisions. The 
AHP has three important components (Alidi, 1996): 
• Structuring the problem into a hierarchy which includes a goal and subordinate 
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features (decomposition) 
• Pair-wise comparison among elements in each level (evaluation) 
• Propagation oflevel specific, local priorities to global priorities (synthesis) 
In these components, subordinates level of hierarchy may consist of objectives, scenarios, 
events, actions, outcomes and alternatives. Pair-wise comparisons are done for various 
components in each level considering the elements in the higher level. Comparing these 
components may be done as preference, importance and likelihood. 
In this research, six different well-known and most usable methods for HEP are evaluated 
and advantages and limitations of different techniques are presented. Subsequently, AHP is 
used to compare different techniques, and to choose an appropriate technique for the 
specific evacuation scenario. 
4.2 Human Error Prediction methods 
There has been some degree of research applied to the quantification of HE P s, however 
only a few of these techniques have been used in practical risk assessments (Embrey et al., 
1984). Here, some of these techniques will be discussed. 
4.3 Success Likelihood Index Methodology (SLIM) 
SLIM was basically designed for HRA, considered as an expert judgment method in 
probabilistic reliability analysis (Svenson, 1989). SLIM is a method for quantifying the 
preference in a set of options. Applicability of SLIM in assessing human reliability 
derives from the consideration that human performance is affected by different factors 
and additive effects influencing these factors (i.e. PSF) to assess a human response 
(Kent et al., 1995). 
SLIM is a simple and flexible method based on an expert judgment approach. The basic 
principle of this method is that the likelihood of a particle error occurring in a specific 
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situation is associated with the combined effect of a relatively small set of PSFs (Raafat et 
al., 1987). 
This method has been considered in different forms such as SLIM-MAUD method 
(Kirwan, 1994). It is a computerized form of SLIM used for determining HEP. Park et al. 
(2008) combined the SLIM with AHP (AHP-SLIM) and applied it to an assessment of 
driver error. The results shows that integrating SLIM with AHP 1s feasible and this 
method overcome the problems of the potential inconsistency of multiple expert 
judgments or the problem with the systematic consideration of PSFs. The SLIM 
procedure is demonstrated in Figure 4.1. 
Deriving a set ofPSFs: 
l 
Ranking ofPSFs based on 
their impoxtanc\! 
Weighting each PSE 
through judgment 
Rating each task through 
judgment 
Computirig;Siiccess 
Likelihoodlnae."' (Stl) 
Convert,ngc SUs. into 
HEPs 
Uncertainty estimation 
Figure 4.1 The SLIM procedure to obtain HEP (Vestrucci, 1988) 
4.4 Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) 
HEART is a technique for comparing HEP and its approach is based on the degree of 
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error recovery. Its fundamental basis is that in reliability and risk equations, one 1s 
interested only m those ergonomics factors which have a large effect on performance. 
Therefore, whilst there are many studied available ergonomics factors, and consequent 
guidelines, which are supported by ergonomics themselves, many of these factors in 
reality have a negligible effect on the operator's performance. Thus, the factors which have 
a significant effect are considered in HEART (Kirwan, 1994). 
This method is easy to understand, fast and reliable. However, its approach is quite 
subjective and heavily reliant on the expenence of the analyst (Casamirra et al. , 2009). 
This technique, while commonly implemented in industry, can also be applied in the 
analyses of air traffic management safety cases (Kirwan et al. , 2007). The HEART 
procedure can be seen in Figure 4.2. 
Identifyingthdull range of 
s~btasks 
DeteimiJ¥ng a noiDina). 
human Ulll"eliability score 
Identifying Error Prodnt~g • 
Conditions (EPC) 
Assessingproport1on of 
affect of. each EPI;' on, HEP 
! 
Calculating the .fii1at estinlate of 
a HEP 
Figure 4.2 The HEART procedure to obtain HEP (Kirwan, 1996) 
4.5 Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) 
THERP is the most common used method in probabilistic safety assessments (J ae et al, 
1995). This methodology includes task analyses and erroridentification and representation, as 
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well as HEPs quantification. Probably, because of its relatively large human error 
database, and its resemblance with engmeenng approaches, it is used extensively in 
industrial applications in companson to other techniques (Kirwan, 1994). THERP uses 
performance-shaping factors to make judgments about specific situations. In some cases, 
however, it may be difficult to accommodate all of the factors that are considered 
significant. While THERP has the advantage of simplicity, it does not account for a 
dependency of human performance reliability with respect to time. This method includes a 
set of tables for evaluating HEPs that provides the basic HEP and the range of effect factors 
related to the activities (Xiaoming et al. , 2005). The procedure of THERP methodology is 
demonstrated in Figure 4.3. 
Defming the system fai1ure5 f>f 
interest 
Analyzing tht<related b'uman'-
operations 
Estimating the relevant error, 
. probabilities 
Estimating the effectf>f l;IEP 
91t the system-'fail\rre event 
Recommending-changes tO' 
the~yst~:m 
Recalculating '·the.'tystem. 
failme probabilities 
Figure 43 The THERP procedure to obtain HEP (Swain et al. , 1983) 
4.6 Absolute Probability Judgment (APJ) 
AP J is a method that employs experts for the direct generation of HEPs. This method differs 
from most models as it employs large groups of assessors. The assessors should be experts 
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and have background knowledge of probability calculation (Kirwan, 1994). The expert 
opinions are received according to one of the following approaches (Stewart et al., 1997): 
• Aggregated individual method 
• Delphi method 
• Nominal group technique 
• Consensus group method 
Selecting subject-matter experts 
~ 
Preparing the task statements 
~ 
Preparing the response booklet 
~ 
Developing instruction for 
subject 
~ 
Obtaining judgment 
~ 
Calculating inter-judge 
consistency 
~ 
Aggregating the individual 
estimates 
~ 
Estimating uncertainty bounds 
Figure 4.4 APJ procedures to obtain HEP (Kirwan, 1994) 
Whenever non-group consensus is used, the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) IS 
necessary to confirm the significant degree of inter-judge consistency between the 
experts. Although there is some empirical support for using AP J, the accuracy of 
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this technique for finding very small error rates is not clear (Stewart et al. , 1997). 
The procedure for the APJ method is illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
4.7 Paired Comparisons (PC) 
Pair wise comparison generally refers to any process of comparing entities m 
pairs that demonstrates which pair IS preferred, or has a greater amount of 
some quantitative property. PC is a scaling techniques based on expert judgment. 
Task definition and expert 
selection 
HU Calculation 
Expert consistency 
determination 
Unc~rtainty estimation. 
. . .. ... . ..... . 
. . .. . ........ . 
............. 
. .......... .. 
Defining the tasks involved 
Incorporatingthe cahbr:ation tasks 
Selecting the expert j udges 
Preparingth~ exercise 
Briefing the experts 
Canying out paired comparison 
Deriving ther:aw .frequency matrix 
Der. the transformationX-matrix 
Der. the column difference Z-matrix 
Calculat e the scale values 
Estimating the calibration points 
Transforming the scale v alues into 
probabilities 
Determining the within-j udge level of 
consistency 
Dete.rmining the inter-judge level ·of 
c.onsistency 
Estimating the uncertainty bounds 
Figure 4.5 PC procedure to obtain HEP (Kirwan, 1994) 
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Analyzing task using 
.HTA 
! 
Taking a task step 
from the bottom level I+--------. 
of the analysis 
Oassifying th,e task 
step into a type from 
the taxonomy: action, 
Checking, information, 
retrieval, selection 
For each error type: 
• Describing the error 
• Determining the 
consequence 
• Entering recovery step 
• Entering ordinal probability 
• Entering criti<:,aiity 
• Proposing remedy 
y 
N 
N 
y 
Figure 4.6 Procedure ofPHEA methodology for finding HEP (Stanton et al., 2002) 
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Judges compare one item with another, and determining which is higher or lower in some 
sort of scale. The technique draws these comparative judgments from different experts, 
and develops a scaling of the tasks in terms of their relative likelihood of error. Two or 
more tasks with known HEPs are then used to calibrate the scaling, based on logarithmic 
transformation for estimating HEPs (Kirwan, 1994). This techniques in extensively used 
for finding HEPs in a variety of industrial sectors as well as the medical field. (Park et al., 
1996). The procedure ofPC method maybe seen in Figure 4.5. 
4.8 Predictive Human Error Analysis (PHEA) 
PHEA is a development of Hierarchical Task Analysis (HT A) in that it uses each bottom 
level task of the hierarchy as its inputs. These tasks are categorized according to a 
predetermined taxonomy and form the basis of subsequent error identification. Thus, the 
first step of a PHEA must be to devise an HT A if one is not already available. Human 
error taxonomy is used to classify tasks into one of five error types (action, retrieval, 
checking, selection, information communication). The analyst then refers to the 
taxonomy to assess credible error modes for each task. Ordinal probability and criticality 
for each potential error is then evaluated consequentiality by the analyst. Then based on 
the subjective judgment of the analyst, possible remedial actions are presented, as well as 
recovery steps at which they may be affected. This process occurs for each bottom-level 
task of the HT A, and the entire procedure is illustrated by means of a flowchart. The 
procedure of using PHEA is illustrated in Figure 4.6 (Stanton et al. , 2002). 
The main strengths of the PHEA method are that it provides a structured and 
comprehensive approach to error prediction, gives an exhaustive and detailed analysis of 
potential errors and the error taxonomy prompts the analyst for potential errors, however 
44 
PHEA is somewhat repetitive and time costly in time to perform (Harris et al., 2005) 
4.9 Evaluating the methods to assess HEP 
There are different techniques available to obtain HEP, but each is not physically usable 
via the whole modeling scenarios. Therefore, one should be familiar with the advantages 
and disadvantages of each technique based on previous investigations to select the 
suitable methodology for the specific case. SLIM is one of the most flexible techniques 
which is validated, but it is a sophisticated method for obtaining PSFs from a judgment 
and it is difficult to ensure about the truly independency of these PSFs. HEART is a 
quick and simple technique to use with little training, but the reliability of the method is 
still not proven. Moreover, the lack of existing validation studies and its high dependency 
on expert opinions are some of HEART's limitations. THEARP was claimed as one of 
the most accurate techniques to determine HEP, but it is not useful in error reduction and 
this technique is highly dependent on the assessors. Therefore, choosing the specific level 
by the assessors may lead to different results. AP J is another technique to obtain HEP 
and it shows an accurate estimate in different fields. The expert discussion provided in 
this technique can be classified and can be quantitatively useful. Although, APJ is 
sometimes prone to certain biases as well as personality/group problems and conflicts. 
PC is a technique that can estimate the relative importance of different human errors or 
human events and can be applied quickly to estimate HEPs. But, this method is not 
suitable for complex predictions of human error and the homogeneity of the events is an 
assumption in this technique that could be subject to error itself. Finally, in PHEA 
technique, error reduction strategies offered as part of the analysis, in addition to 
predicted error. But, this technique does not model cognitive components of error 
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mechanisms. The advantageous and limitations of using these techniques to estimate HEP 
can be seen through Table 4. 1 (Apostolakis et al., 1988; Vestrucci, 1988; Kirwan, 
1994; Humphreys, 1995; Kirwan 1996; Kent et al., 1995; Stanton et al. , 2002; Salmon 
et al. , 2003; Park et al. , 2008). 
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Method 
SLIM 
HEART 
THERP 
Table 4.1 Advantages and disadvantages of different techniques for evaluating HEP 
Advantages 
This is a flexible technique (dealing with the entire 
range of 
HE forms without requiring a detailed 
decomposition of the task is possible). 
It is validated according to a variety of cases until 
now. 
It is usually a highly plausible approach for the 
assessors (regulators and experts) who participate. 
It is quick and simple to use with little training. 
Each error-producing condition has a remedial 
measure related to it. 
It gives the analyst quantitative output. 
HEART uses fewer resources m companson 
to other techniques such as SHERPA. 
It is highly flexible and applicable to different areas. 
It has been well used in practice over the past three 
decades. 
It has good accuracy of performance. 
It is claimed as one of the most powerful 
methodologies in 
HRA 
Disadvantages 
It is a sophisticated method for obtaining PSFs from a judgment. 
It is difficult to ensure that the PSFs are truly independent 
The choosing of PSFs is currently somewhat arbitrary and so 
unsatisfactory affair. There is a lack of selection criteria for choosing 
good experts. 
Probabilities of target tasks may be modified by adding a new task to 
the set. SLIM's PSFs are fairly global in comparison to the more 
specific PSFs in methods such as HEART 
There are some doubts over the consistency of the method. 
There is a shortage of validation studies. 
Dependence and EPC interaction is not accounted for by 
this method. It is subjective, reducing its reliability and 
consistency. 
This technique would still require considerable development to be 
used in different domains. 
It is strongly based on the expert opinions in the point of 
probabilities of human error and also in the assessed proportion of 
EPC effect 
It has limited usefulness in error reduction 
It has a variable resource used level (In some cases, it can be resource 
intensive) 
It is strongly based on the assessors and choosing the specific 
level by the assessors may lead to different HEPs 
It does not present sufficient guidance in modeling both scenarios 
and the impact of PSFs on error 
It is relatively psychologically opaque, considering external 
error modes in compare with psychological error mechanisms 
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APJ 
PC 
PHEA 
It showed an accurate estimate in different fields 
(e.g. Weather 
forecasting) 
It is quick to use 
The expert discussion provided m this 
method can be documented and can often itself be 
qualitatively useful Expert discussion in this 
method leads towards the consideration 
of how to achieve error reduction 
Human judgement evidence is greater than the 
numerical 
assessment 
It can estimate and control part of the system with 
specific data It can work with a minimum of two 
empirically estimated HEP values 
It can estimate the relative importance of 
different human errors or human events 
It can be quickly applied 
Structured and comprehensive procedure, yet 
maintains 
usability 
Taxonomy prompts analyst for potential errors 
Encouraging validity and reliability data 
Substantial time economy compared to observation. 
Error reduction strategies offered as part of the 
analysis, in addition to predicted errors 
It is sometimes prone to certain biases, as well as personality/group 
problems and 
conflicts 
It is often associated with guessing and produces a somewhat 
low degree of apparent or face validity 
It is based on the selection of appropriate experts, but there is a 
lack of selection criteria for choosing good experts 
It may not be suitable for complex predictions of human error 
Homogeneity of the events or tasks is an assumption that could be 
subject to error 
Independence of each comparison causes the distortion of results 
The judges could become tired by the large number of comparisons 
Can be tedious and time-consuming for complex tasks 
Extra work involved ifHTA not already available 
Does not model cognitive components of error mechanisms 
Some predicted errors and remedies are unlikely or lack credibility, 
thus posing a false economy 
Current taxonomy lacks generalisability 
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4.10 Using AHP to choose the optimum method according to the specific case study 
The scenario considered in this research is the evacuation of a building in an 
emergency condition. Five different criteria, as shown in Table 4.2, are considered 
to compare different methods to obtain HEP for this specific case. These criteria were 
selected based on previous investigations in HEP techniques comparison (Kirwan, 1988). 
Description of these criteria is not discussed within this research, as there were 
described previously (Kirwan, 1988). The criteria demonstrated in Table 4. 2, are 
sorted based on their importance for this scenario. Therefore, individuals who want to 
find the suitable method for their own case should sort them based on their own 
limitations and conditions. 
In the second step, each of the methods (illustrated in Table 4.1) are compared with 
another based on each of the criteria listed in Table 4. 2. An example of one of the 
spreadsheet in the second step, each method (illustrated in Table 4.1) is compared with 
another based on each of the criteria mentioned in Table 4.2. An example of one of the 
spreadsheets used for this comparison is shown in Table 4.1 of the appendix. Assessing 
the previous literature about these techniques and their implementation in different case 
studies and comparing these techniques with another (Bernhard Zimolong, 2003; Park 
et al., 2008; Kirwan.1996) may help to learn about the advantages and disadvantages of 
each method and their comparisons respectively. 
Finally, following a comparison of these techniques according to characteristics specified 
for this modeling scenario, Expert Choice software, which is a multi-objective support 
tool based on analytical hierarchy process, is used to discover a suitable technique to use 
for this modeling scenario. 
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Table 4.2 Criteria considered in this comparison based on their priority 
No. Criteria 
1 Accessibility 
2 Usefulness 
3 Validity 
4 Accuracy 
5 Resource usage 
4.11 Results of using AHP 
Comparing the six existing techniques based on the criteria mentioned above leads to the 
following results, as shown in Figure 4.7. 
PHEA 
APJ 
Figure 4.7 Comparing different techniques using AHP 
The results show that SLIM is the best option among these techniques according to the 
specific criteria that are considered in this case study. AHP is highly dependent on the 
weighting of the selected criteria. Therefore, changing the priority of these criteria based 
on any other cases may effect on the results. Using AHP in this scenario show priority of 
each technique and their final ranking percentage based on comparing the technique 
according to each criteria and weighting the criteria themselves as shown in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3 Priority of techniques received using AHP 
Technique 
SLIM 
THERP 
HEART 
APJ 
PC 
4.12 Application of SLIM (Case study) 
Final value received by AHP 
0.275 
0.264 
0.152 
0.152 
0.098 
As evaluated in the section, SLIM is selected according to the selected criteria and 
their priority. Therefore, implementing SLIM to find HEP for the scenario of building 
evacuation in a fire situation is considered in this research as a case study. 
4.13 Scenario description 
The scenario considers a business building in a fire evacuation emergency. The alarm 
detectors are located in different parts of the building in the construction stage. 
Following the alarm sounding in the building due to fire, staff and visitors are to evacuate 
the building. During this evacuation, two different scenarios for the staff and visitors are 
considered. In this research, the evacuation of the building by a visitor to the building 
is evaluated. 
When the alarm sounds, visitors should look for someone who works in the building to 
identify the type of the alarm. If they find staff, visitors should follow them and evacuate 
the building. In the case where visitors can not find someone knowledgeable of how to 
safely evacuate the building, they will have to make egress decisions on their own and 
likely assist others facing the same situation. Evaluating potential egress paths and 
selecting the appropriate route by moving along the egress route create the following 
steps. It should be noted that the quality of the exit route should be assessed while 
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moving to a temporary safe refuge. This modeling scenario is demonstrated in Figure 4.8. 
Find egress route 
Ascertain what 
danger is imminent 
Decideto evacuate and.assist 
others if required or as: directed 
Evaluatepotential egress paths 
choose and move along 
Assess quality of exit route-
while moVil;l.g to temporarjr safe 
refuge 
Muster point 
Follow the staff 
Figure 4.8 Scenario considered for the visitors evacuation 
4.14 Evaluating PSFs for this scenario 
The performance shaping factors utilized in this case will influence the probability of 
failure are stress, training, experience, even factors, and time. These factors are described 
in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4 PSFs considered in this scenario 
PSF Description 
Stress The inability to complete the task successfully due to anxiety and pressure. 
Distraction PSF that affects the likelihood of a task being completed successfully 
because of lack of focus due to the extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance. This, combined with a high level of stress, can make actions 
that are normally simplistic in nature complicated and/or cumbersome. 
Training Relates to an individual's ability to most effectively identify muster alarm 
and perform the necessary actions to complete muster effectively. 
Experience Related to how a person will complete the muster task successfully. 
Event The location of the individual with respect to the initiating event 
factors and/or the magnitude and dimension of the initiating event can dictate the 
performance of an individual in an emergency situation. 
Time Depending on the definition of the action, the time required may include 
both the time required to diagnose the problem and the time to physically 
accomplish the action. The time available would then be measured 
from the first indication available to the staff and visitor. 
In the next step, each PSF is weighted by judges who are considered to this scenario to 
obtain HEP. The questionnaire filled by these judges can be seen in Table 4.2 of the 
Appendix. The values of weighting of these PSFs received from judges are described in 
Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5 Weighted values ofPSFs 
PSF Weighted Value 
Stress 0.3 
Distraction 0.1 
Training 0.15 
Experience 0.2 
Time 0.1 
In the final stage, HEPs using SLIM for this case study is received as can be seen in 
Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6 HEP for Visitors using SLIM 
Events 
Alarm Sounding 
Looking for staff/ host to identify type of alarm 
Finding egress route 
Follow the staff 
Ascertain what danger is imminent 
Take decision to evacuate, Assist others if needed or as directed 
HEP (Visitor) 
7.94E-02 
4.73E-03 
8.58E-04 
4.99E-01 
2.80E-03 
5.05E-03 
Evaluate potential egress paths and choose Move along egress route l.OSE-04 
Assess quality of exit route while moving to temporary safe refuge 3 . OOE-04 
Muster point 1.53E-Ol 
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4.15 Conclusion 
Evaluating some of the well-known techniques based on their advantages and 
disadvantages, and using AHP for choosing the appropriate techniques to obtain HEP 
lead to following results: 
A methodology to choose the appropriate technique for specific scenano 
according to characteristics of each technique and required criteria is necessary 
• Using AHP regarding to possible techniques and specific criteria can be a suitable 
methodology for determining appropriate techniques to obtain HEP 
• Although SLIM is selected based on the criteria considered for the case study 
presented in this research, individuals should compare these techniques based 
on their own cases and criteria for each specific scenario 
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Appendix 4.1 Comparing different techniques based on accuracy of the models 
Methods Value Methods 
SLIM 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 HEART 
SLIM 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 THERP 
SLIM 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 APJ 
SLIM 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 PC 
SLIM 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 PHEA 
HEART 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 THERP 
HEART 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 APJ 
HEART 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 PC 
HEART 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 PHEA 
THERP 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 APJ 
THERP 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 PC 
THERP 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 PHEA 
APJ 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 PC 
APJ 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 PHEA 
PC 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 PHEA 
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Appendix 4.2 The sample of visitor's questionnaire 
Visitor's Questionnaire Stress Distraction Training Experience Event Time 
Factor 
The relative importance of hearing or 4 
recognize the alarm 
The relative importance of finding the staff 6 
The importance of finding egress route 6 
How import it is to follow the staff 
How important it is to identify the risk of 7 
human related to the danger (reason for the 
alarm) 
The importance of taking decision to evacuate 7 
How important it is to make choice of egress 8 
Route 
How important it is to assess quality of exit 7 
route while moving to temporary safe refuge 
The relative importance of designate muster 
Point 
8 
6 
6 
9 7 8 9 
7 7 
6 5 
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5 Determination of human error probabilities in maintenance 
procedures of a pump t 
Preface 
A version of this manuscript has been published in the Journal of Process safety and 
Environmental protection. Noroozi was the main lead on the work. The co-authors, Drs. 
Khan, MacKinnon and Amyotte supervised the principal author. They helped to develop 
the methodology and cross checked the analysis. The co-author Mr. Deacon supplied the 
list of activities from industry sources. Noroozi, developed the research, analyzed the 
human reliability, and utilized HEART methodology. Noroozi also prepared the first 
draft of the manuscript while the co-authors Drs. Khan, MacKinnon and Amyotte 
reviewed the manuscript and provided the necessary suggestions. 
Abstract 
The "human factor" constitutes an important role in the prediction of safe operation of a 
facility. Hence, information about human capacities and behaviors should be applied 
methodically to increase the safety of a systematic process. This research provides an 
analysis of human factors in pre- and post- maintenance operations. For possible failure 
scenarios, this research considers the procedures for removing process equipment from 
service (pre-maintenance) and returning the component to service (post-maintenance). In 
this study, a pump is used as the test example. For each scenario, the HEP is calculated 
for each activity, using the HEART which is commonly implemented technique in 
industry, can also be applied in the analyses of safety cases. HEART is a reliable 
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technique for comparing HEP and its approach is based on the degree of error recovery. 
Consequences are also assessed for each activity in this methodology. The final value of 
risk for each activity is assigned by combining error likelihood and related 
consequences. When the calculated risk is beyond acceptable levels, risk management 
strategies are provided to increase the safety of the maintenance procedures. The most 
probable human errors for a considered case study are related to the activities of 
"draining lines" and "open valves". These two activities have high HEPs, which are 
9.57E-01 and 9.62E-01, respectively. 
5.1 Introduction 
Based on Norman (1981) and Reason (1990), an "error" occurs in situations 
where an act is committed both intentionally and unintentionally; however, the error itself 
and the original intention of the act are often viewed separately. Sanders and McCormick 
(1993) view human errors as inappropriate decisions that have a negative effect on system 
safety effectiveness and performance. They also argue that providing a classification 
system may help to organize human error data and provide insight into how errors can be 
prevented. Several studies have determined that such errors are a major cause of accidents 
in construction (Suraji et al., 2001) and manufacturing (DuPont Safety Resources, 2000; 
Lawton and Parker, 1998; Rasmussen et al. , 1994; Sanders and McCormick, 1993). 
According to Dhillon (2006) poor design factors including issues involving equipment, 
maintenance, and work layout, and difficulties faced by workers, such as improper work 
tools, fatigue on overstressed workers and environmental factors, such as humidity, 
lighting, temperature, etc are the main reasons of error occurrence in maintenance 
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procedures. Improper training, the use of outdated maintenance manuals and a lack of 
proper experience contribute to high numbers of maintenance errors as well. There are 
some factors which can improve the work environment such as, providing more 
experience, ensuring emotional stability and hiring workers who have a greater aptitude 
for their environment, which can lead to less fatigue, more satisfaction and better team 
work. 
Nelson (1996) argued that accident occurrence due to maintenance activities as 
well as over speed protection equipment should be a cause for concern in the industry. 
Balkey (1996), however, asserted that risk based inspection procedures and human error 
procedures in fossil fuel plants must be taken into account when conducting inspection 
procedures. Further data is contributed by Eves' ( 1985) report on accidents which 
occurred in the chemical manufacturing industry during times of maintenance. 
Raman et al. (1991) contributed guidelines to apply Hazop techniques in the application 
of maintenance procedures conducted on offshore oil and gas platforms, while 
Underwood ( 1991) examined the effect of safety systems in the chemical industry 
through inspecting various case studies on the topic. Further research has been done by 
Dhillon and Yang (1995) who developed a new stochastic model to analyze the rates of 
human error and failed system repairs and how they affected reliability and availability of 
the machines. After examining the ratio estimation of HEP, Park and Jung (1996) 
suggested that, through linear transformation, and simple techniques of converting ratios, 
they can determine objective HEP. Further studies were done by Anderson et al. (1998) 
on reduced manning and how it affects the types of human errors experienced in systems 
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operations and maintenance. Finally, Mcroy ( 1998) concluded that collecting samples of 
the different types of errors and interactions one experiences can be helpful in preventing 
such errors. 
Jacob et al. (1997) found that critical human errors were a common cause for 
failure as a result of repairs done on two unit standby systems. Similarly, Sur and Sarkar 
(1996) found that redundant systems regularly caused human errors and logic failure and 
proposed a probabilistic model. Different probabilistic models were developed by Dhillon 
and Rayapati (1988b) who used supplementary variables method to develop system 
availability expressions represented by the human errors found in two unit parallel and 
standby redundant systems. 
Further studies have been conducted on the topic of systems failures and human 
errors by Sridharan and Mohanavadivu (1997), who studied three Markov models of two 
non-identical unit parallel systems, by Narmada and Jacob (1996) who used a stochastic 
model representing a three unit system and by Dhillon (1989) who analyzed repairable 
and non-repairable redundant systems and human errors, establishing a reliability 
analysis. A basic, but useful, study was done by Reason (1990) who gave an overview of 
basic error mechanisms and what types of errors occur. In an attempt to deal with the 
problem of human error, Su et al. (2000) suggested using a knowledge-based system to 
analyze cognitive types and enhance fault recovery ability using a practical framework, 
while Gupta et al. (1991) examined overloading effects and critical human error during 
repair waiting times in a multi-component parallel system. 
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Chung (1987) examined human error and common-cause failures usmg a 
repairable parallel system with standby units. The existence of human error in the form 
of fault injection was studied by Carr and Christer (2003) who used data on these 
phenomena to extend the mathematics model of delay-time of inspection maintenance 
during the inspection process. Ramalhoto (1999) outlined critical safety measures after 
studying maintenance personnel, while Vaurio ( 199 5), in an attempt to address human 
errors and common cause failures, supplied a procedure that could be used in various 
situations to ensure proper maintenance and safety tests for certain systems and also 
reviewed some earlier models which attempted to address HEPs in a separate researches. 
Human analysis and repair times in a system were researched by Dhillon and Yang 
(1993), while Sanders and McCormick (1993) outlined the types ofhuman factors which 
can contribute to errors in maintenance in direct or indirect ways. Bradley (1995) 
presented a methodology which can be useful in helping determine the causes of human, 
design and maintenance errors. Miller and Swain (1986) examined the effects of human 
errors on system performance, equipment or task characteristics and work potential, and 
how they can be changed to reduce these errors. In an earlier study, Dhillon (1986) 
outlined the various aspects present with regards to human factors and maintenance, such 
as reliability and error, revisiting the topic in a 2002 book. Gramopadhye and Drury 
(2000) gave their theories behind the increases in maintenance and inspection errors, 
while Dodson and Nolan (1999) examined the human factors behind field tests, 
production and man-machine function allocation. 
Conclusively, the study of human factors is an important area of process engineering and 
it includes the systematic application of information about human characteristics and 
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behavior to improve the performance of human-machine systems (McSweeney et al., 
2008). 
Researchers have suggested different quantitative techniques to estimate the HEPs. SLIM 
has been used as a methodology to estimate the HEPs in the case of emergency 
evacuation of an offshore oil and gas platform (DiMattia et al., 2005). Kirwan has also 
well explained the application of other quantitative techniques such as HEART, and 
TTHERP to the hypothetical cases (Kirwan, 1996). 
Several studies have compared different methods (e.g. SLIM, HEART, and THERP) for 
finding HEP. These studies considered both the advantages and disadvantages of these 
techniques with respect to HEP under various scenarios (Stanton et al., 2002; Salmon et 
al., 2003; Park et al., 2008). 
Although modern information database systems can achieve a high degree of automation, 
human factors still play an important role in process installations, especially maintenance 
activities (Frank, 1996). One vital consideration is the impact of human error. This 
research examines pre- and post-maintenance activities of a condenser pump as the 
context to understand the role of human error. HEPs are evaluated using the HEART. 
Activities with high HEPs are identified, and mitigation measures are recommended to 
reduce errors to obtain lower probabilities of poor outcomes as a result of human error. 
A risk-based methodology is developed for pre- and post-maintenance in section 
2. The HEART methodology explained in section 3. Brief descriptions of the application 
of HEP for pre- and post -maintenance of a pump with different scenarios are presented in 
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section 4. Section 5 identifies the relevant consequences for each activity. Section 6 
shows how to calculate the HEP for each activity. Measuring the risk level for each task 
and identifying the high risk activities are done in sections 7 and 8. Remedial measure 
with recommend appropriate mitigation measures for tasks with higher HEP in order to 
reduce the probability of human error are presented in section 9. The discussion and 
conclusion with recommendations for future work are presented in sections 10 and 11. 
5.2 Developing a risk-based methodology for pre- and post-maintenance 
There are different techniques available to obtain HEP, but each method is not 
physically usable via the whole modeling scenarios. Therefore, one should be familiar 
with the advantages and disadvantages of each technique based on prevwus 
investigations to select the suitable methodology for the specific case. 
Individuals who want to find the suitable method for their own case should sort them 
based on their own limitations and conditions, after comparing each methods based on 
each of the criteria. Considering different standards, this research suggest HEART 
methodology as the most applicable technique. 
Different human activities occur in pre- and post-maintenance procedures for pieces of 
equipment. A risk -based methodology can be developed to assess the risks of these 
activities (see Figure 5.1). The HEPs are estimated by applying the HEART process. 
After obtaining the HEPs based on a described work activity or scenario, the final value 
of the risk is calculated by integrating both the HEPs and the consequence analysis 
results. Whenever the calculated risk exceeds acceptable criteria that are based on 
specified guidelines, then a risk management approach is employed to minimize the risk. 
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Figure 5.1 Risk- based methodology for minimizing HEP 
5.3 HEART approach 
HEART is a technique for evaluating HEP, based on the demands of a task, the 
inherent risk within the task and the opportunities for error recovery. The fundamental 
basis of this approach lies in reliability and risk equations, with a focus on ergonomic 
factors that have a large effect on performance. Many studies have examined ergonomic 
factors and their consequences, even though the studies have a negligible effect on 
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operator performance, factors that do have significant effects on performance are 
considered in HEART (Kirwan et al., 1996). 
The maximum impact of each individual factor (total HEART effect) was 
determined by various studies of human factors performance over a long period of time. 
These data come from extensive research on human error in several industries collected 
by Williams, (1986) who developed the HEART methodology. 
The HEART method is easy to understand and is quickly implemented. However, 
its approach is quite subjective and heavily reliant on the experience of the analyst 
(Casamirra et al., 2009) this may call into question the method's overall reliability if not 
applied by competent personnel. 
The HEART method utilizes the following steps (Kirwan, 1996): 
• Assign step to a generic error category 
• Choose generic error probability 
• PSFs that apply to the step 
• Determine the weight of each applicable PSF on the step 
• Calculate the overall HEP 
The PSFs are named EPCs in HEART. 
The HEART method begins with selecting a genenc error category and an 
associated generic error probability (GEP) within each of the eight generic error 
categories (Kirwan et al., 1996). 
Next, the assessor will determine the factors that influence the HEP, known as 
EPC. There are 38 EPCs. The first 17 EPCs have the greatest influence on HEP (Kirwan 
et al., 1996). 
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Selection of the proper EPC among the 38 possibilities is usually based on 
developing a scenario for the task under consideration. Each EPC has a maximum 
nominal amount, which should be inserted in Equation 1 as the error-producing condition 
representative. The next step is to Assess the Proportion Of Affect (APOA), which is 
weighted for each chosen EPC based on its importance by the expert judges. In this way, 
each EPC is individually weighted from 0 to 1 (Williams, 1988). 
Assessed Effect = (Maximum effect - 1) * APOA + 1 ( 1) 
Equation 1 is used to calculate the effect of each EPC and its relevant APOA on 
the GEP. The HEP of each task is calculated by multiplying the selected GEP with the 
nominal amount of APOA related to each EPC (Williams, 1988). 
5.4 Application of HEP for pre- and post-maintenance of a pump 
5.4.1 Scenario development 
This scenario considers pre- and post-maintenance procedures for condensate 
pumps. These procedures include eight scenarios, one for each of the eight activities. 
Activities 1 and 2 involve pre-maintenance, and activities 3 to 8 address post-
maintenance. These activities were developed in conjunction with Single Buoy Moorings 
(SBM) Company in Nova Scotia. 
The scenarios developed based on maintenance reports of offshore platform in Iran and 
these were selected based on the most frequent occurring scenario. The accessibility of 
the data and availability of the experts were the reasons why offshore platform in Iran 
was chosen. 
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5.4.2 Pre-maintenance 
Pre-maintenance activities have been assigned to the first two activities: "prepare 
work" and "isolate pump." In the following sections, the sub-activities of each activity 
and their related scenarios are explained. 
5.4.2.1 Prepare work 
Work preparedness IS the first activity for performing maintenance of a 
condensate pump which contains of 17 sub-activities as shown in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Sub-activities considered for activity 1 
Activity 1. Prepare work 
1.1 Area Authority (AA) prepare work order 
1.2 Apply for permit to work 
1.3 Perform equipment diagnostics 
1.4 Identify equipment affected and tags used 
1.5 Perform risk assessment of activity 
1.6 Check work order and ensure no conflict of operation 
1.7 Determine and certify required isolations 
1.8 Permit to Work Coordinator (PTWC) obtains keys and certificates 
1.9 AA authorizes work 
1.10 
PTWC assigns lockout box and gives keys to supervisors affected 
by isolation 
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1.11 Perform and document initial gas test 
1.12 Rank fluid contained within pump 
1.13 Determine size of inlet and outlet lines from pump 
1.14 Identify most appropriate isolation method 
1.15 Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) approve work activity 
1.16 Workforce Supervisor (WFS) hold toolbox meeting 
1.17 
Place Permit to Work (PTW) on permit board with copy displayed 
at work site 
5.4.2.1.1 Describing the Scenario for Activity 1: Prepare for work 
This scenario involves running pre-maintenance activities according to the 
predefined work schedule. This occurs under limited time constraints. Increasing 
workload within a limited time frame leads to long hours of non-stop work, imposing 
stress and fatigue and causing problem for personnel. The following scenario descriptors 
and worker characteristics are defined from maintenance offshore platform team in Iran. 
1. Generally, there is insufficient training for the workforce in identifying workplace 
hazards and working with PTW systems. 
2. The supervisor is a new employee who has not passed the related health and safety 
hazard identification training courses. 
3. The testing equipment is not calibrated according to the manufacturer's specifications 
and there is no new testing equipment available. 
4. The operator is inexperienced in isolation methods. 
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5. The engineer who is training the operators has not approved the standard operating 
procedures; hence, he or she does not understand the process completely. 
6. The supervisor also has little knowledge of potential plant hazards. 
5.4.2.2 Isolate pump 
Isolation of the pump IS the second activity for the pre-maintenance of a 
condensate pump. It contains 16 sub-activities, as shown in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 Sub-activities considered for activity 2 
2.0 Isolate Pump 
2.1 Check lines for fluid and pressure 
2.2 Check bleeds/vents for obstruction 
2.3 Close isolation valves 
2.4 Lock and tag isolation valves 
2.5 Depressurize lines 
2.6 Drain lines 
2.7 Purge lines 
2.8 Perform pressure test and isolation leak test 
2.9 Open all drains of affected equipment possible 
2.10 Perform mechanical isolation (fit slip plates, disconnect lines, etc.) 
2.11 Re-pressurize lines 
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2.12 Isolate, lock and tag motor from control centre 
2.13 Test motor for power 
2.14 Revalidate permit with supervisors 
2.15 Break containment 
2.16 Continue testing pressure and isolation at intervals 
5.4.2.2.1 Describing the Scenario for Activity 2: Isolate pump 
1- An inexperienced operator is working in an environment with a high level of 
nOise. 
2- The manager in charge is known for the emphasis on minimal mean time between 
failures in order to prevent production delay. 
3- The operator is under pressure to address any failure as soon as possible. 
5.4.3 Post-maintenance 
The post-maintenance activities for a condensate pump are categorized into six 
topics as shown in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Activities of post- maintenance task 
3.0 Re-connect pump 
4.0 (WFS) Ensure site and equipment left in safe state 
5.0 (WFS) Return keys and certificates 
6.0 (PTWC) Ensure site ready for reinstatement 
7.0 (PTWC & AA) Close Permit to Work 
8.0 Open valves and reinstate pump 
The following sections describe the sub-activities and their related scenarios. 
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5.4.3.1 Describing the Scenario for Activities 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 
After each maintenance service, the operators and engineers must continue with 
post-maintenance activities, since production must not be halted for extended periods of 
time. These activities focus on returning the system to normal operation. In this scenario, 
characteristics include: 
1. Some young operators have logged insufficient training hours. Due to the high 
amount of work undertaken, the work pressure is high, which leads to intense 
fatigue for the workers. 
2. An inexperienced workforce engineer is responsible for ensuring site readiness for 
reinstatement. The site engineer is using a poorly written report to perform an 
inspection and to ensure that the site and equipment are in safe conditions. 
3. The responsible incoming assistant lacks adequate information regarding returning 
keys and supplying certificates. 
Table 5.4 shows the sub- activities considered for activities 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. 
Table 5.4 Sub- activities considered for activity 3, 4,5,6,7 
Sub Activity Activity 
3.1 Check lines and equipment for obstructions 
3. Re-connect 3.2 Remove mechanical isolation/connect lines to 
pump pump 
3.3 Remove locks and tags from valves, leaving 
valves closed 
4. (WFS) Ensure 
site and 
equipment left in 
safe state 
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5. (WFS) Return 
keys and 
certificates 
6. (PTWC) 6. 1 Return lock-out keys 
Ensure site 6.2 Give worksite authority back to AA 
ready for 
reinstatement 6.3 (Supervisors) Document reinstatement 
7. (PTWC and 
AA) Close 
Permit to Work 
5.4.3.2 Describing the Scenario for Activity 8: Open valves and reinstate pump 
1- A fairly inexperienced operator takes action, despite the predefined standards 
and related tasks. 
2- The instrumentation is unreliable, which may cause malfunctions in the related 
procedure. 
3- The system feedback is unreliable. 
4- The supervisor is too busy to provide complete supervision for the procedure. 
5- There is insufficient time, due to the urgency of starting operations to prevent 
extra costs. 
Table 5.5 shows the sub - activities considered for activity 8. 
Table 5.5 Sub-activities considered for activity 8 
Sub -activity for open valves and reinstate pump 
8.1 Test pressure 
8.2 Remove air from lines and pump 
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8.3 Open valves, fill pump and test for leaks 
8.4 Start pump 
5.5 Consequence 
The consequence analysis of each ofthe tasks involved in pump removal and 
reinstatement is shown in Table 5.6. Kletz (2009) was consulted as an aid in determining 
the possible consequences of error for each task. It is an extensive collection of 
information and reports of past incidents. 
Table 5.6 Consequences considered for each activity 
Activities Conse_quences 
1.0 I Prepare work 
1.1 (Area Authority) Prepare work order • Operators or control room unaware 
of maintenance work 
• Serious injury or death 
1.2 Apply for Permit to Work • Operations and maintenance 
personnel unaware of conflicts 
• Damage to equipment 
• Serious injury or death 
1.3 Perform equipment diagnostics • Personnel not completely aware of 
ISSUe 
• Damag_e to e_g_uiQ_ment 
1.4 Identify equipment affected and tags used • Discrepancy between maintenance 
team and control room 
• Operators not aware pump should 
be removed from service 
• Serious injury or death 
1.5 Perform risk assessment of activity • Maintenance personnel 
misunderstand hazard level, 
unnecessary exposure to risk 
• Damage to equipment 
• Injury/death 
1.6 Check work order and ensure no conflict of • Operations and maintenance 
operation or other work personnel unaware of new 
developments or conflicts 
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• Damage to equipment 
• Injury/death 
1.7 Determine and certify required isolations • Operations personnel perform 
inadequate isolation 
• Damage to equipment 
• Injury/death 
1.8 (Permit to Work Co-ordinator) Obtain keys • Maintenance personnel 
and certificates required misunderstand hazard level, 
unnecessary exposure to risk 
• Damage to equipment 
• Injury/death 
1.9 (AA) Authorize work • Maintenance personnel 
misunderstand hazard level, 
unnecessary exposure to risk 
• Damage to equipment 
• Injury/death 
1.10 (PTWC) Assign lockout box and give keys to • Operations or maintenance 
supervisors affected by isolation personnel open valve that should 
be closed 
• Damage to equipment 
• Injury 
1.11 Perform and document initial gas test • Explosion during hot work 
• Damage to equipment 
• Injury 
1.12 Rank fluid contained within pump • Work order personnel unable to 
determine most appropriate 
isolation method 
• Maintenance personnel exposed to 
unnecessary risk 
• Damage to equipment 
• Injury/death 
1.13 Determine size of inlet and outlet lines from • Work order personnel unable to 
pump determine most appropriate 
isolation method 
• Maintenance personnel exposed to 
unnecessary risk 
• Damage to equipment 
• Injury/death 
1.14 Identify most appropriate isolation method • Maintenance personnel exposed to 
unnecessary risk 
• Damage to equipment 
• Injury/death 
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1.15 (OIM) Approve work activity • Maintenance personnel 
misunderstand hazard level, 
unnecessary exposure to risk 
• Damage to equipment 
• Injury/death 
1.16 (Workforce supervisor) Hold toolbox • Maintenance and operating 
meeting personnel unprepared for job, 
unnecessary exposure to risk 
• Damage to equipment 
• Injury/death 
1.17 Place PTW on permit board with copy • Operators not aware pump should 
displayed at work site be removed from service 
• Serious injury or death 
2.0 I Isolate pump 
2.1 Check lines for fluid and pressure • Explosion during hot work 
• Damage to equipment 
• Injury/death 
2.2 Check bleeds/vents for obstruction • Potential for trapped pressure, 
fluid hazard and/or missiles 
• Damage to equipment 
• Injury 
2.3 Close isolation valves • Personnel exposed to hazards 
within equipment 
• Damage to equipment 
• Injury/death 
2.4 Lock and tag isolation valves • Operations or maintenance 
personnel open valve that should 
be closed 
• Damage to equipment 
• Injury 
2.5 Depressurize lines • Personnel exposed to contents of 
pipe or pump 
• Injury/death 
2.6 Drain lines • Contents of pipes or pump 
exposed to work area 
• Damage to equipment 
• Injury/death 
2.7 Purge lines • Explosion during hot work 
• Damage to equipment 
• Injury/death 
2.8 Perform pressure test & isolation leak test • Explosion during hot work 
• Damage to equipment 
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• Injury/death 
2.9 Open all drains of affected equipment • Inadequate relief from fluid or 
possible pressure hazards 
• • • Damage to equipment 
• Injury/death 
2.10 Perform mechanical isolation (fit slip plates, • Contents of pipes or pump 
disconnect lines, etc.) exposed to work area 
• Damage to equipment 
• Injury/death 
2.11 Re-pressurize lines • Damage to equipment 
• Injury 
2.12 Isolate, lock and tag motor from control • Damage to equipment 
centre • Injury 
2.13 Test motor for power • Maintenance personnel unaware 
that motor still has power 
• Damage to equipment 
• Injury 
2.14 Revalidate permit with supervisors • Operations and maintenance 
personnel unaware of new 
developments /conflicts 
• Damage to equipment 
• Injury/death 
2.15 Break containment • Contents of pipes or pump 
exposed to work area 
• Damage to equipment 
• Injury/death 
2.16 Continue testing pressure and isolation at • Conditions in pipes or pump 
intervals become hazardous 
• Damage to equipment 
• Injury/death 
3.0 Re-connect pump 
3.1 Check lines and equipment for obstructions • Obstructions or contaminants in 
system 
• Damage to equipment 
3.2 Remove mechanical isolation/connect lines to • Damage to equipment 
pump • Injury 
3.3 Remove locks and tags from valves, leaving • Leakage of fluid from pipes, 
valves closed exposure to danger if hot work 
nearby 
• Injury/death 
4.0 (WFS) Ensure site and equipment left in safe • Personnel exposed to uncontrolled 
state workplace hazard 
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5.0 
6.0 
6.1 
6.2 
6.3 
7.0 
8.0 
8.1 
8.2 
8.3 
8.4 
• Injury 
(WFS) Return keys & certificates 
(PTWC) Ensure site ready for reinstatement 
Return lock-out keys 
Give worksite authority back to AA 
(Supervisors) Document reinstatement 
(PTWC & AA) Close Permit to Work • Damage to equipment 
• Injury 
Open valves and reinstate pump 
Test Pressure • Damage to equipment 
• Injury_ 
Remove air from lines and pump • Damage to equipment 
Open valves, fill pump and test for leaks • Damage to equipment 
• Injury 
Start pump • Damage to equipment 
• Injury 
5.6 HEP calculation 
The HEART methodology was used to calculate the HEP for all above activities. 
A detailed calculation for the sub-activity 1.1 , "prepare work order by area authority," is 
described below as a sample of the procedure. The first step is to determine a Generic 
Task (GT). According to the classification of generic tasks and associated unreliability 
estimates in HEART methodology (Kirwan et al. , 1996), the GT considered for this sub-
activity is "E." For type E task, the nominal unreliability is 0.02. The EPCs and their 
maximum predicted nominal amounts related to this sub-activity have been selected, 
based on the scenario illustrated above. 
A proportionate weight factor is applied when an EPC is applied. This is shown in 
the column labeled "Assess Proportion of Effect" in Table 5.7. 
According to Table 5.7, the values 0.2, 0.5, and 0.7 are considered for these EPCs, 
based on the degree of effectiveness of each EPC on human error. Poor information 
quality is the most important factor contributing to errors. If the information is 
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communicated poorly or if the information is inaccurate, then errors will happen more 
frequently. 
Based on equation (1) the assessed effect of each EPC is calculated: 
Assessed effect (for EPC 1) = (17- 1) *0.2 + 1 
The same calculation has been done for other EPCs: 
HEP oftask 1.1= 0.02* 4.2* 3.5* 2.4= 7.06E-01 
Table 5.7 The HEP calculation of sub activity No. 1.1 
E 0.02 Unfamiliar with a situation 17 0.2 4.2 
A channel capacity overload 6 0.5 3.5 
Impoverished quality of 3 0.7 2.4 information 
Total assessed EPC effect 35.28 
The same calculation has been done for the HEP of other sub-activities. The results are 
shown in Table 5.8 for pre-maintenance activities and Table 5.9 for post-maintenance 
activities. 
The above method is the simplest formula to be used to obtain HEP. However it would be 
a great idea to use stochastic models. HEP calculation still used in empirical formulation 
and more sophistication is needed. Simplistic approach of human error quantification 
suggested that more quantitative approach such as Markov models could be used. It needs 
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to be considered that human behavior or human actions are highly variable and 
unpredictable; therefore the use of empirical formulation 1s supenor to statistical 
technique. 
Table 5.8 Probability of error of pre-maintenance activities 
Activities HEP 
1.0 Prepare work 
1.1 (Area Authority) Prepare work order 7.06E-Ol 
1.2 Apply for PTW 3.17E-Ol 
1.3 Perform equipment diagnostics 7.74E-01 
1.4 Identify equipment affected and tags used 7.74E-01 
1.5 Perform risk assessment of activity 3.58E-01 
1.6 Check work order and ensure no conflict of 2.69E-Ol 
operation or other work 
1.7 Determine and certify required isolations 1.49E-01 
1.8 PTWC obtain keys and certificates required 4.73E-01 
1.9 AA authorize work 1.69E-Ol 
1.10 PTWC assign lockout box and give keys to 1.39E-01 
supervisors affected by isolation 
1.11 Perform and document initial gas test 9.20E-02 
1.12 Rank fluid contained within pump 5.02E-01 
1.13 Determine size of inlet and outlet lines from pump 1.78E-01 
1.14 Identify most appropriate isolation method 1.92E-02 
1.15 OIM approve work activity 1.73E-01 
1.16 WFS hold toolbox meeting 2.37E-Ol 
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Activities HEP 
1.17 Place PTW on permit board with copy displayed at 4.32E-Ol 
work site 
2.0 Isolate pump 
2.1 Check lines for fluid and pressure 8.64E-01 
2.2 Check bleeds/vents for obstruction 5.36E-01 
2.3 Close isolation valves 8.85E-01 
2.4 Lock and tag isolation valves 2.38E-02 
2.5 Depressurize lines 9.09E-01 
2.6 Drain lines 9.57E-01 
2.7 Purge lines 9.09E-Ol 
2.8 Perform pressure test & isolation leak test 4.66E-01 
2.9 Open all drains of affected equipment possible 2.13E-Ol 
2.10 Perform mechanical isolation (fit slip plates, 5.04E-02 disconnect lines, etc.) 
2.11 Re-pressurize lines 9.24E-03 
2.12 Isolate, lock and tag motor from control centre 5.62E-02 
2.13 Test motor for power 8.47E-01 
2.14 Revalidate permit with supervisors 8.18E-01 
2.15 Break containment 3.36E-01 
2.16 Continue testing pressure and isolation at intervals 3.08E-01 
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Table 5.9 Probability of error of post-maintenance activities 
Activities HEP 
3.0 Re-connect pump 
3.1 Check lines and equipment for obstructions 2.73E-Ol 
3.2 Remove mechanical isolation/connect lines to 7.49E-01 pump 
3.3 Remove locks and tags from valves, leaving 4.03E-Ol 
valves closed 
4.0 WFS ensure site and equipment left in safe 2.02E-02 
state 
5.0 WFS return keys & certificates 3.35E-Ol 
6.0 PTWC ensure site ready for reinstatement 
6.1 Return lock-out keys 3.43E-01 
6.2 Give worksite authority back to AA 3.50E-02 
6.3 (Supervisors) Document reinstatement 8.99E-Ol 
7.0 PTWC & AA close PTW 7.78E-Ol 
8.0 Open valves and reinstate pump 
8.1 Test Pressure 3.74E-Ol 
8.2 Remove air from lines and pump 4.91E-02 
8.3 Open valves, fill pump and test for leaks 9.62E-Ol 
8.4 Start pump 2.30E-Ol 
These results expected to be validated w1th the mdustry data. 
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5.7 Assign consequences and estimate risk level 
Sub-activity 2.6, "drain lines," with a HEP equal to 9.57£-01 , and sub-activity 
8.3, "open valves, fill pump, and test for leaks," with a HEP equal to 9.62£-01, have high 
HEPs and high consequences, including injury and death. 
Risk is a function of the probability of error and the severity of the error 
consequences. HEP and the severity of the consequences are evaluated for each activity. 
The overall risk of human error is identified for each activity by integrating the HEP and 
consequence severity. If the risk of an activity is too high, risk reduction measures are 
considered to reduce the risk. 
According to ISO 17776, DiMattia (2005) proposed a risk matrix that is a function 
of probability and severity. The color of each block in the matrix shows the level of 
emergency action needed, ranging from green (no risk), which requires no safety actions, 
to red (high risk), which needs vital mitigating measures. The acceptable risk is based on 
the company criteria that accept the levels of risk and the numerical values are shown in 
table 5.11. Similar to this convention, risk is divided into three categories: 
• High risk: red blocks 
• Lower risk: yellow blocks 
• Lowest risk: green blocks 
Table 5.10 shows the consequence categories, and Table 5.11 is the risk table. In Table 
5.11, the HEPs are divided into four different ranges of 0.1 to 1, 0.01 to 0.1, 0.001 to 
0.01 , and 0.0001 to 0.001, subsequently. This table also demonstrates different 
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consequences as well. By having the specific HEP and particular consequence for each 
activity, this table will assist to estimate the final risk value. 
Table 5.10 Consequence categories (DiMattia, et al., 2005) 
Severity Consequence 
Critical (C) Extremely important because of being or happening at a time of 
special difficulty, danger, leads to death 
High (H) Significant physical injury can happen 
Medium (M) There is a chance of minor to moderate injuries to occur 
Low (L) Most likely there will be no injuries 
Warning (W) Lack of implementation 
Table 5.11 Risk table (DiMattia, et al. , 2005) 
Consequence Severity 
Category HEP Critical High Mediu Low Warning 
m 
(C) (H) (L) (W) 
(M) 
A 0.10 to 1.0 
8 0.01 to 0.10 
C 0.001 to 0.01 
D 0.0001 to 0.001 
5.8 The most probable human errors 
Two activities with high HEP and high consequences (Block 2A in Table 5.11) 
were studied in detail in order to reduce the probability of human error occurrence: 
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• Sub-activity 2.6, "drain lines," with HEP equal to 9.57E-01; 
• Sub-activity 8.3, "open valves, fill pump, and test for leaks," with HEP 
equal to 9.62E-01. 
5.9 Remedial measures 
HEART provides a framework that helps assessors recommend appropriate 
mitigation measures for tasks with higher HEP in order to reduce the probability of 
human error. By dividing each of the EPC-assessed effects by the total, the relative 
contribution to the error probability of each of the EPCs can be evaluated. 
The following strategies are provided in order to reduce the probability of human error. 
5.9.1 Remedial measure for "drain lines" activity 
In this activity, time shortage and unfamiliarity with unknown situations are the 
highest contributing factors to unreliable modification as shown in Table 5.12. To address 
situations arising from unfamiliarity with unknown situations, infrequent events should be 
anticipated, redundancy systems and appropriate tools should be utilized, and operators 
should be properly trained. These remedial measures will also save time. 
Table 5.12 shows the relative contribution made by each of the EPCs for the drain 
line activity to the value of unreliability modification. 
Table 5.12 Contribution of each EPCs to unreliability modification 
% contribution made to 
EPC 
unreliability modification 
Unfamiliarity with the situation 53 
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Time shortage 26 
Operator inexperienced 7 
No independent checking 8 
Unreliable instrumentation 6 
Table 5.13 shows remedial suggestion for drain lines activity. 
Table 5.13 Remedial measure for drain lines activity 
Unfamiliarity with a • Putting in place a pre-work procedure to analyze the 
situation (x 17) work beforehand to identify infrequent and rare 
emergency events 
• Using redundant components to save time 
Time shortage (x 11) • Having maintenance based on prescribed schedule 
• Posting experienced operators to particular task in 
order to save time 
• Completing the training successfully by all the 
operators 
Operator inexperienced • Supporting the inexperienced operators by the 
(x 3) expert operators 
• Not using inexperienced operators for high risk 
components 
• Reporting to supervisor by the operator after No independent finishing each task 
checking (x 3) 
• Rechecking by the supervisor 
Unreliable • Being aware that the equipment which operator is 
instrumentation (x 1.6) working with is not completely reliable 
5.9.2 Remedial measures for "open valves, fill pump, and test for leaks" activity 
In this activity, the major contributing factor is time constraints. To improve this 
situation, maintenance can be conducted based on a prescribed schedule; furthermore, 
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more experienced operators can be posted to particular tasks in order to save time. The 
relative contribution of each EPC for the "open valves, fill pump, and test for leaks" 
activity ofunreliability modification is shown in Table 5.14. 
Table 5.14 Contribution of each EPCs of unreliability modification 
% contribution made to 
EPC 
unreliability modification 
Time shortage 38 
Ambiguity in standards 17 
Poor system feedback 16 
Operator inexperienced 10 
Impoverished quality of 
11 
information 
Unreliable Instrumentation 8 
Remedial recommendation shows in Table 5.15. 
Table 5.15 Remedial measures of Open valves fill pump and test for leaks activity 
• To use redundant components to save time 
Time shortage (x 11) • Maintenance based on prescribed schedule 
• To post experienced operators to particular 
task in order to save time 
• Using comprehensive and update standard 
Ambiguity in standards (x 5) 
• Clarify and rephrase ambiguous statements 
to simple word for better understanding 
Poor system feedback (x 4) 
• Effective communication between relevant 
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operators and maintenance staff, helping to 
build proper feedback and thus to prevent 
the error 
• Operators must successfully complete the 
training 
Operator inexperienced (x 3) • The expert operators should support inexperience operators 
• Do not use inexperienced operators for high 
risk component 
• Effective communication between involved 
Impoverished quality of information persons, sectors and management for better 
(x 3) organizational learning which in turn 
increases the quality of information 
• Operator should be aware that the equipment 
Unreliable Instrumentation (x 1.6) operator is working with is not completely 
reliable 
5.10 Discussion 
Since its initial development, HEART has proven to be an extremely popular 
technique, especially within the engineering community. This technique is easy for non-
specialists to understand and use, and the EPCs and their multipliers are based on 
experimental human-performance data. The EPCs selected in this research are the most 
common factors that influence human performance in maintenance activities. One of 
HEART's primary strengths is that it contains the appropriate data required to perform 
human reliability assessments, which can be achieved, by human error identification, 
human error quantification and human error reduction. In particular, no external databases 
are required. For this reason, the technique is highly attractive to non-specialist users. 
HEART is simple to handle, which makes it an attractive proposition. 
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The results of this research demonstrate that the calculated HEPs for pump pre-
and post-maintenance tasks are in the range of 9.24E-03 and 9.62E-Ol. The maximum 
HEPs are related to the "open valves, fill pump, and test for leaks" and "drain lines" 
activities, due to their time shortages and the operators' unfamiliarity with those 
situations. Applying consequence analysis and calculating the risk value showed that the 
risk values for these activities are extremely high. Using redundant components, 
experienced operators, and scheduled maintenance to save time and to identify emergency 
events beforehand are helpful remedial actions in these situations, which will reduce the 
risk value. Application of a risk-based decision-making process to manage the HEPs was 
investigated previously, by DiMattia (2004), who used the SLIM to calculate the HEPs. 
The risk values for other tasks applied in this research are below the acceptable limit 
since they belong to the lower and lowest risk categories. This demonstrated that the 
probabilities of conducting errors when performing these tasks are acceptable, and no 
remedial actions should take place. 
5.11 Conclusion 
In this study, a human reliability analysis for the pre-maintenance and post-
maintenance activities of a pump was analyzed, utilizing HEART methodology. To 
perform this study, a scenario was developed for each category of activities. Based on 
these scenarios, the nominal amount of HEP was calculated for each sub-activity. 
According to the results, two activities had high HEPs: "drain lines" and "open valves, fill 
pump and test for leaks." In order to reduce the probability of human error, required 
remedial measures were recommended for these activities. Related injuries and deaths 
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could be decreased by optimizing the design and utilization of some equipment and 
devices and by hiring more experienced operators or improving the level of their training. 
This study identified the high risk activities and discussed ways to prevent failure. 
The ultimate future work is to improve variability and minimizing uncertainty. Also 
testing and validating methodologies to have better understanding of the calculation of 
HEPs and possible improvement of the techniques. 
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6 Human Error Probability Assessment during the Maintenance 
Procedures of Offshore Oil and Gas Facilities by Using an Integrated 
Methodt 
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Abstract 
The research presents a novel approach for HEP assessment by integrating the Success 
Likelihood Index Method (SLIM) with the THERP. In this approach, the SLIM has been 
embedded within the THERP framework to generate the nominal HEP data when it is 
unavailable. The developed methodology has been implemented in an offshore 
condensate pump maintenance task. In the first step of this study, the human error has 
been estimated considering all the standard tools and procedures which are in place. In 
the second step, as an additional measure, RFID based tools have been utilized and HEP 
has been recalculated. Without the application of RFID tools, the HEP value is estimated 
as 5.72% and with RFID tools, it has been reduced to 4.63%, which yields a net HEP 
reduction of 1.09%. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Human error management is receiving growing interest in industries to reduce the risk 
associated with the production loss, asset damage, and fatality. Over the last few years, a 
number of major accidents occurred in different industries as a result of incorrect 
operations, and maintenance. Human error is directly or indirectly related to a number of 
factors which are called PSF. The PSFs are commonly categorized as external, internal, 
psychological and physiological factors. External PSFs are the factors associated with the 
situational and equipment characteristics, procedural and perceptual requirements and 
quality of the work environment. Internal PSFs are related to the individual characteristics 
such as skills, motivation, experience, mental strength etc. The psychological factors are 
the factors which directly affects the mental stress such as task load, task speed, task type 
etc. Physiological factors are those which affect the physical stress such as discomfort, 
hunger, thirst, extreme temperature etc. [1]. 
In maintenance activities, PSFs are considered as the major contributors to human 
error [2-4]. Therefore, in reducing human error attempts have been taken to analyze the 
PSF factors involved in a specific maintenance activity. In order to improve the PSF 
factors, the industries have taken initiatives in three major directions: i) change of 
equipment, tools, or process ii) change of procedure and iii) change of management 
system [5]. Change of equipment or tool has brought simpler deigns of the equipment and 
use of more accurate and easy handling tools in maintenance. The procedural change has 
involved more comprehensive research to introduce the simple and systematic procedure 
to carry out a complex task, team involvement rather than individual accomplishment. 
Administrative control is focused on the management of human activity and skill, stress, 
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and work environment. Researchers investigated factors related to Situation Awareness 
(SA) in aviation maintenance teams at a major airline [6]. The analysis recommended a 
training program is important to improve the SA in maintenance. 
Some studies have linked mental workload to be an important factor to human work 
perfom1ance [7-10]. The European Joint Aviation Authotity depicted that enor rates may 
increase when the technicians or engineers undetiake more or less workload than the 
usual. This is a patiicular feature of some industry areas, such as line and base 
maintenance [11]. 
To reduce the human enor in maintenance activity, the use of work permit is very 
common in different industries [12-13]. It is a detailed document that authorizes certain 
people to cany out specific work at a particular time, which demonstrates the hazards 
associated with the work and the precautions to be taken in particular situations. 
However, the typical work permits cannot provide detailed information and do not meet 
user expectations [ 14-15]. 
Computer-based procedure (CBP) and computer-based training (CBT) and aiding 
programs have been developed for inspection and maintenance. These replace the use of 
research based work permits. CBP/CBT provides detailed information along with 
graphical presentation which is easy to follow and update. Researches has been carried 
out on the computer-based aiding approach in maintenance activity [5; 16-17]. 
Researchers have proposed an online aiding system for human enor management [5]. In 
addition to the computer based training and aiding, the online aiding system provides the 
list of potential enors in each step of a task and provides with the quantitative human 
enor risk index for each enor type. This creates the risk informed awareness among the 
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individuals and makes them careful to carry out the task without error. 
Along with the procedural development, significant effort has been made to simplify 
the design of the equipment and tools to reduce human error in maintenance activity. 
Improper selection of equipment, component and spare parts is also a significant 
contributor to human error in maintenance activity. Therefore, research has been carried 
out to develop the computerized inventory management and asset tracking system. 
The emergence of RFID system is replacing the technology based on barcode based 
identification systems. RFID tag is accurately readable by RFID reader from near or far 
locations. This helps to have the updated information of the tagged items at any specific 
time [ 18-19]. The usefulness of RFID system has been demonstrated through wide case 
studies in asset or item tracking, inventory control, personal identification, time and 
attendance system, and process control in numerous facilities [ 18]. However, so far, no 
case study is available to demonstrate the applicability of the RFID technology in 
industrial operations and maintenance to reduce the human error. Alongside the 
improvement of the PSF factors, significant effort has been devoted to develop 
approaches to quantify the HEP in industrial activities. The approach should be 
reasonably accurate to predict the HEP value; the underestimation might lead to a severe 
accident. 
In this research, the HEP in an offshore pump maintenance activity has been 
estimated using the THERP technique. THERP is a well-known technique to estimate the 
HEPs, which conceived mainly for the nuclear industry [ 1; 20] and validated repeatedly 
by applying to different cases in industries [21; 22]. 
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In this research, a new methodology is developed to solve one of the main challenges 
of using THERP to estimate HEPs, which is unavailability of nominal error data for all 
types of tasks. To demonstrate the application of the new methodology, a case study of 
estimating HEPs in maintenance procedures of offshore oil and gas condensate pump is 
considered. In the first step of this case study, the HEPs are quantified considering all the 
standard tools and procedures which are in place. In the second step, as an additional 
measure, RFID based tools have been incorporated and HEPs have been recalculated. The 
difference demonstrates the applicability of the RFID to reduce HEP in maintenance 
activity. 
6.2 Major Human Error Probability Assessment Methods 
The human error quantification techniques are based on two principles: i) subjective 
judgment and ii) human error data base. The techniques employs subjective judgments 
depend on a number of experts having complete knowledge about the task for which HEP 
will be evaluated. The experts analyze the task and the relevant PSFs and provide their 
opinion; which are manipulated within the framework of a specific method to obtain the 
HEP value. The common methods in this category are: i) APJ, ii) PC, iii) SLIM and iv) 
AHP-SLIM. The major problems associated with the expert judgments are the 
inconsistencies of the results among different experts. The absolute judgment method 
based on direct judgment of experts without manipulating the opinion further in any 
specific framework [23]. This method is relatively quick; the results could be 
qualitatively useful to take the improvement measures to reduce the human error. The PC 
technique involves the paired comparison of the judgment of experts, which are further 
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manipulated to develop a HEP scale [24]. It uses at least two empirically estimated 
known HEP values for calibration and with the help of logarithmic correlation; the final 
HEP values are obtained. This method can estimate the relative importance of different 
human error specific to a task. PC may not be suitable for predicting the human error in a 
complex situation. 
SLIM is the most flexible technique and widely used among the methods those uses 
expert judgment. In the SLIM approach, the judges identify the important PSF factors 
associated with a specific task; the contribution of each PSF factor to cause the human 
error is judged and a relative weight is assigned [25]. This PSF rating is used to calculate 
a success likelihood index, which is calibrated with two known HEP values and with the 
help of a logarithmic equation, the desired HEP value is estimated. SLIM places no 
constraints on the analyst in terms of the factors that are assumed to influence error 
probability in the task being assessed. The analyst is also able to take into account the 
differential weights or levels of influence that each Performance Influencing Factor (PIF) 
may have in a particular situation. The technique allows the effects of changes in the 
quality of the PIFs and also assumptions about their relative influence to be evaluated as 
part of a cost-effectiveness analysis designed to achieve the greatest improvements in 
human reliability at minimum costs. However, since the analyst needs to construct a 
model of the factors influencing performance in the situation being assessed, some degree 
of human factors knowledge will be necessary to use the technique effectively. The 
technique is therefore likely to be less favored by engineering users than by human 
factors specialists. The technique also requires that calibration data are available, 
preferably from the domain in which the technique is being applied, although expert 
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judgment can be used for this purpose if no hard data are available [26] . Moreover, the 
inconsistency may arise during the PSF rating, and the PSF evaluation might not be very 
straightforward when the PSF conditions are difficult to understand or not constant. To 
reduce the inconsistency in the judgments of PSFs, AHP-SLIM has been developed. The 
analytical hierarchy approach is used to check consistency among the experts and induce 
failure likelihood, while the SLIM approach is used to convert the likelihood into HEPs 
[27]. This helps to improve the quality of judgment through the use of the structured 
framework associated with AHP. However, in cases of SLIM or AHP-SLIM one major 
disadvantage is that the choice of anchor point is very critical and the calibration equation 
does not have sufficient evidence to conclude that it is well established. One of the 
common issues with all the aforementioned method is the selection of judges. It becomes 
a challenge to have the required number of judges available who can evaluate the 
situation adequately. The common methods which use the available human error data as a 
basis are HEART, Justification of Human Error Data Information (JEHDI), and THERP. 
These techniques could be easily implemented by a single assessor. 
In the HEART, a task is classified into one of the generic task categories. Then the 
nominal HEP value is assigned to the task. In the next step, the EPC or PSFs are 
determined and the maximum proportion of effect of each PSF on the nominal HEP is 
determined [28] . In the final step, the final HEP is calculated using a simple mathematical 
formula considering the nominal HEP, number of EPC and the maximum effect of 
proportion. The technique has some specific features such as easy understanding and use 
by non-specialists, and the EPCs and their multipliers are provided based on experimental 
data on human performance [29]. However, the major problem of the HEART technique 
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is that the assessment of the proportion of affect is highly judgmental which is a potential 
source of inconsistency and may affect the reliability of the technique. 
The JEHDI is a computerized method developed by [30], which is not available in 
public domain. The selection of the most similar error descriptor and the answering of the 
questions are the primary area for potential inconsistency. 
In the THERP technique, the task is decomposed into different task levels. For each 
task level, the nominal human error data is collected from the THERP handbook. The 
nominal HEP of each task level is modified by considering the effects of PSF. In the next 
step, the dependency between different HEPs is considered [ 1]. The final HEP is 
calculated using an ET relationship. The THERP technique is very established technique 
and is used extensively in industrial applications in comparison to other techniques [21]. 
The major problems associated with the THERP technique is the unavailability of 
nominal error data for all types of tasks. The determination of the effects of PSF factor is 
highly judgmental, which may significantly affect the final value of the estimated HEP. 
However, integrating of SLIM and THERP as a part of a methodology developed in this 
research overcomes the existing problem. As a result, wherever nominal error data is 
unavailable in the THERP handbook, the SLIM has been used to estimate the HEP value 
for a specific task element. 
6.3 Case Study: Scenario 
The case study investigates pre and post-maintenance procedures for a condensate 
pump, which is typically used on offshore platforms. A condensate pump is used to pump 
condensate water produced in heating or cooling, refrigeration, condenser boiler furnaces, 
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or steam systems. It may be also used to pump the condensate produced in many 
applications such as refrigerated air in cooling and freezing systems, steam in heat 
exchangers and radiators, and the exhaust steam of very-high-efficiency furnaces. 
Maintenance operations for a condensate pump can be divided into three steps: i) pre-
maintenance, ii) maintenance and post-maintenance However, the focus of this study is 
on pre- and post-maintenance and for each category, different activities (or main-tasks) 
are assessed. 
There is an array of responsibilities involved with pre and post-maintenance activities. 
Responsibilities are given to a range of different workers, who specialize in different 
aspects of maintenance activities and bring with them different HEPs relevant to their 
tasks. The following types of people are considered to be directly or indirectly involved in 
this maintenance activity: i) maintenance manager, ii) technician, iii) supervisor, iv) 
inventory manager. The field maintenance team is considered to be consisted of three 
members. The workers in this study are considered to be working 8 hours per day. The 
weather conditions on an offshore platform are considered to be harsh, especially in the 
winter (thunderstorms, and heavy precipitation). 
6.4 Task Analysis 
6.4.1 Analysis of pre-maintenance activities 
The first step in HEP analysis is to identify the activities necessary m the pre-
maintenance of a pump. Such activities are mentioned in Table 6.1. The first category 
involves the preparations needed before the removal of the pump, while the second 
category involves the removal of the pump so that it may be serviced. 
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Table 6.1 Activities during pre-maintenance of a pump 
1.0 Prepare work 
1.1 Perform equipment diagnostics 
1.2 Identify equipment affected and tags used 
1.3 Perform and document initial gas test 
1.4 Rank fluid contained within pump 
1.5 Identify the most appropriate isolation method 
1.6 Hold a toolbox meeting 
2.0 Isolate pump 
2.1 Check lines for fluid and pressure 
2.2 Check bleeds/vents for obstructions 
2.3 Close isolation valves 
2.4 Lock and tag isolation valves 
2.5 Depressurize lines 
2.6 Drain lines 
2. 7 Purge lines 
2.8 Perform pressure test & isolation leak test 
2.9 Open all drains of affected equipment possible 
2.10 Perform mechanical isolation (fit slip plates, disconnect lines) 
2.11 Re-pressurize lines 
2.12 Isolate, lock, and tag motor from control center 
2.13 Test motor for power 
2.14 Continue testing pressure and isolation at intervals 
6.4.2 Analysis of post-maintenance activities 
The next step is developing post-maintenance activities. Activity 3.0 explains the 
reconnection of the pump to the operating system. While activities 4.0 and 5.0 explain the 
preparations needed to return the pump back to an active position. Table 6.2 explains 
items 3.0 to 5.0, which concern post-maintenance pump procedure. 
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Table 6.2 Activities during post-maintenance of a pump 
3.0 Re-connect pump 
3.1 Check lines and equipment for obstructions 
3.2 Remove locks and tags from valves, leaving valves closed 
4.0 Ensure the site and equipment are left in a safe state 
5.0 Open valves and reinstate pump 
5.1 Test pressure 
5.2 Remove air from lines and pump 
5.3 Open vales, fill pump and test for leaks 
6.4.3 Identify the probability of pre-maintenance errors 
Once all of the activities have been identified for pre and post-maintenance activities, 
the next phase is to decompose each main activity into different task elements. The 
importance of dividing the main tasks into elements is so that HEPs can be made more 
accessible. Furthermore, performance-shaping factors may also be identified that would 
mostly affect the performance of a task. The nominal HEP value of each task element has 
been collected from [1]. Table 6.3 illustrates the breakdown of few main tasks to their 
task elements. 
Table 6.3 Main tasks accompanied with task elements 
Main Tasks 
Identify equipment affected 
and tags used 
Hold a toolbox meeting 
Task Elements 
• All affected equipment not identified 
• Equipment not tagged properly 
• Tag not clear 
• Failure to keep record of tagged 
equipment 
• Toolbox meeting was not held 
• Failure to identify all required tools 
• Failure to list required tools properly 
109 
Close isolation valves 
Test pump pressure 
• Feed valves to pump were not closed 
properly 
• Failure in closing valves properly lead to 
valves left partially opened 
• Failure to close all valves when check list 
is used 
• Failure to close all valves when check list 
is not used 
• Failure in testing lines or pump for 
pressure 
• Failure to use a checklist 
• Failure in interpreting data correctly 
• Failure in recording the test data 
6.4.4 Nominal HEP values and Modifications 
Once task elements are produced for each main task, nominal HEPs must be attained 
for each task element. It is important to note that at this point for assigning task elements, 
it is nearly impossible to predict all errors of commission. However, a competent analyst 
should be able to predict most erroneous acts by maintenance workers. The nominal 
human error data from Tables in the THERP handbook were then assigned to each task 
element. From these HEPs, the analysis used the lower bounds of all nominal values in 
attempts of accounting for the age of the handbook [1]. Since being published in 1983, it 
would be more sensual to use these values because of updated safety practices and 
industry standards in the last 28 years. For HEP values that could not be found in the 
handbook, SLIM has been used to generate the HEP data. The nominal error data 
collected from the THERP handbook needs to be modified considering simultaneous 
error of the team members, dependency among them and various PSF factors. 
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6.4.4.1 Simultaneous Error 
Simultaneous error is perhaps one of the simpler modifications to implement. This 
type of error arises when there is more than one operator working on the same task. Since 
there is more than one operator assigned to the same task it, is obvious that the probability 
of error for a given task would be significantly less due to two or more individuals 
thinking independently of each other. To calculate simultaneous error, the nominal HEP 
value is raised to the power of the number of people attempting a task. For example, the 
nominal value for failure to follow a written procedure is 0.5. However it is assumed that 
three people in a maintenance team will influence each other to follow written procedure, 
therefore the value is modified to 0.53 or roughly 0.001. 
6.4.4.2 Dependence 
Another modification used in this step is dependency. When the Probability Of 
Success (POS) or failure in one task directly affects the POS in another, then the tasks are 
said to be dependent on each other. In this study, a dependency model has been used to 
modify the nominal HEP value. The model utilizes different degrees of dependency, 
varying from zero dependence to complete dependence. 
It is very difficult to judge which intermediate state is most appropriate to use and 
often times the expertise of the analyst is relied on. However the basic rule of thumb is 
that low dependence is used when the level of dependence between two tasks is slightly 
higher than zero, moderate dependence is used when an intermediate level of dependence 
is present, and high dependence is used when the level of dependency between two tasks 
is slightly less that complete dependence. 
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For each level of dependency, there are different equations used to calculate a new 
HEP value with the exception of zero and complete dependency. This is due to the fact 
that if there is zero dependency between tasks, then they are independent of each other 
and the nominal HEP values should be a sufficient representation of human error. Below 
are the equations use to assess dependency where "n" is the nominal HEP value [31]. 
Table 6.4 The set of dependency equations 
[ZD] = n 
[LD] = (1 + 19n)/20 
[MD] = (1 + 6n)/7 
[HD] = (1 + n)/2 
[CD]= n = 1.0 
In a team work, the dependency among team members is calculated based on these 
dependency equations. The first operator does not depend on other operators. However, 
the dependency of the next operator on the first operator needs to be assessed. The second 
operator, for example could be following direct orders from the first operator who is not 
dependent, possibly affecting the actions of the second operator (especially, if the first 
operator is wrong in his task). A similar approach is taken in the case of the third 
operator, who may be dependent on the second operator, who is similarly dependent on 
the first operator, giving the third operator the highest degree of dependency. Once the 
case is judged, the nominal value needs to be substituted into the appropriate equation and 
a new HEP value for the task evaluated to account the dependency. 
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6.4.4.3 Performance shaping factors 
Once the nominal HEP values are collected and modified for accounting the 
simultaneous error and dependency effects, data is further modified to account the effect 
of performance shaping factors specific to the task. Performance shaping factors 
addresses how an operator will perceive what is required of him or her and how he will 
handle his tasks given external, internal, and stressor influences [32]. Generally, PSF 
factors are divided into three groups. These groups are: 1) external PSFs, 2) internal 
PSFs, and 3) stressors. 
External PSFs encompass the conditions that affect the work environment. They are 
global and can be related to many tasks. However, they may be related to a specific job or 
a set of procedures. Below are some common external PS factors that are used in HEP 
analysis: 
• Temperature, humidity, and air quality 
• Hours worked 
• Availability of tools, and supplies 
• Organization 
• Procedures required 
• Perceived requirements 
• Decision making 
• Memory 
• Written and oral communication 
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Internal PSFs considers the individuals' characteristics, such as their skills, 
motivations, and attitude etc. that influence their performance. Listed below are some 
common internal PS factors used in HEP analysis. 
• Experience 
• Skill 
• Intelligence 
• Motivation 
• Attitude towards his/her work 
• Knowing acceptable standards 
Stressors are otherwise known as specific conditions that affect an operator mentally 
or physically and in most cases contribute to an error in performing the task. However, if 
there is little or no stress, then task performance also may decrease due to many factors 
like carelessness, and overconfidence. Therefore, a certain degree of stress is required in 
most tasks to maintain an optimal degree of task performance. Listed below are some 
common stressor PS factors used in HEP analysis: 
• Duration of stress 
• Task load 
• High risk 
• Monotonous/ meaningless work 
• Sensory deprivation 
• Fatigue 
• Hunger/ thirst 
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• Radiation 
6.4.4.4 Calculating modification factors for PSF 
PSFs are the major determiners of HEP. Researchers recommend multiplying the 
nominal HEPs by modifying factors to account the effect of PSFs [1]. Unlike 
dependency, there is no straightforward equation to calculate PSF influences. This is 
because these factors will interact and influence each other making each case unique to 
the factors present. Previous studies [33] used the percentile score concept to evaluate the 
quality of each PSF which is combined with the relative weight of each PSF to obtain the 
composite quality score. 
Researchers analyzed the PSF quantitatively [32]; the relative weight of each PSF is 
combined with the performance rating of the human for determining the human factor 
index. In both cases a mapping method is used to modify the nominal HEP and the 
relative weights ofPSF are determined using analytical hierarchy method [34]. The above 
studies did not address how to rate the performance of the operators when the task is 
performed in a team. 
The THERP handbook provides guidelines for estimating HEPs for four levels of 
stress: very low task load, optimum task load, heavy task load, and threat stress. 
However, only a few modifiers (multiplication factors of I, 2, or 5) are available and it is 
not a systematic and elaborate method [33]. 
In this research, the important PSFs specific to a task are screened out from a large 
number of PSFs. The modifying factor (MF) for each important PSF specific to an 
operator is determined based on the subjective judgment, which are averaged for the team 
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members. The MF for all PSFs are then multiplied together to obtain the overall MF 
which are used to modify the nominal HEP of the task element. 
Table 6.5 below shows that for task A, three PSFs are considered to be important: i) 
training, ii) experience, and iii) knowledge. For task B, also three PSF are considered: i) 
knowledge, ii) time/pressure, and iii) stress. The HEP assessors then judge, by what 
percentage each operator will increase the HEPs of task element A and B. Since it is more 
realistic to judge under the basis that each operator may have different levels of training, 
experience, and knowledge specific to a task, it was assumed that among them there 
would be a supervisor who would contribute little to no extra error, an operator of 
medium contribution and a third operator of medium to high contribution. Their 
contributions specific to a PSF are averaged to obtain the modifying factor for that PSF. 
Table 6.5 The nominal HEPs 
Task A 
Training- (1.05 + 1.00 + 1.05)/3 = 1.03 (increases the nominal HEP by 3%) 
Experience - (1.1 0 + 1.05 + 1.0)/3 = 1.05 (increases the nominal HEP by 5%) 
Knowledge- (1 .05 + 1.0 + 1.1 0)/3 = 1.05 (increases the nominal HEP by 5%) 
Overall multiplying factor: 1.03 x 1.05 x 1.05 = 1.13 
TaskB 
Knowledge - (1.1 0 + 1.00 + 1.05)/3 = 1.05 (increases the nominal HEP by 5%) 
Time/ pressure - (1.1 0 + 1.05 + 1.15)/3 = 1.10 (increases the nominal HEP by 
10%) 
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Stress- (1.1 0 + 1.10 + 1.05)/3 = 1.08 (increases the nominal HEP by 8%) 
Overall multiplying factor: 1.05 x 1.10 x 1.08 = 1.24 
The overall multiplying factors 1.13 and 1.24 are used to multiply the nominal HEPs 
of the tasks A and B, respectively. 
6.5 Calculating the HEP value 
After modifying the nominal HEP values, they are combined with the help of ET 
relationship to obtain the HEP value for each main task of the pump maintenance activity. 
Table 6.6 lists the HEP values for each main task of the condensate pump maintenance 
after taking account of simultaneous errors, dependency, PSFs. 
Table 6.6 Final HEP values for maintenance tasks 
Main Activities 
1.0 Prepare work 
1.1 Perform equipment diagnostics 
1.2 Identify equipment affected and tags used 
1.3 Perform and document initial gas test 
1.4 Rank fluid contained within pump 
1.5 Identify the most appropriate isolation method 
1.6 Hold a toolbox meeting 
2.0 Isolate Pump 
2.1 Check lines for fluid and pressure 
2.2 Check bleeds/vents for obstructions 
2.3 Close isolation valves 
2.4 Lock and tag isolation valves 
2.5 Depressurize lines 
2.6 Drain lines 
2. 7 Purge lines 
2.8 Perform pressure test & isolation leak test 
2.9 Open all drains of affected equipment possible 
2.10 Perform mechanical isolation (fit slip plates, 
disconnect lines) 
HEP 
7.41x1 o-4 
1.00x1o-s 
1.363x10-3 
2.25x10-3 
9.39x10-3 
2.346x10-3 
2.09x 1 o-3 
1.69x10-3 
5.66x10-4 
1.09xl0-4 
1.30x 1 o-3 
1.28x10-4 
1.28x10-4 
7.62x10-3 
6.06x10-4 
1.11 x 1 o-3 
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2.11 Re-pressurize lines 
2.12 Isolate, lock, and tag motor from control center 
2.13 Test motor for power 
2.14 Continue testing pressure and isolation at intervals 
3.0 Re-connect pump 
3.1 Check lines and equipment for obstructions 
3.2 Remove locks and tags from valves, leaving valves 
closed 
4.0 Ensure the site and equipment are left in a safe state 
5.0 Open valves and reinstate pump 
5.1 Test pressure 
5.2 Remove air from lines and pump 
5.3 Open vales, fill pump and test for leaks 
6.5.1 Bounding Analysis 
2.52xlo-
1.66x 1 o-3 
7.27xl0-3 
8.022x10-3 
1.69x 1 o-3 
1.125x10-3 
1.2lxl0-3 
1.85xl0-3 
3.08xlo-3 
8.08x10-4 
Uncertainty bounds are used because of the involvement of some degree of subjective 
judgment to estimate the effect of PSF factors and uncertainties in nominal HEP data. 
Uncertainty bounds help to include all possible inconsistency resulting from random 
sources and differences between operators. The case study has considered that for the 
uncertainty, the lowest considerable limit of uncertainty should be 5xl o-5. For evaluating 
uncertainties of the HEP value, the guidelines prescribed in the THERP handbook as 
shown in Table 6. 7 is followed in this study. If an HEP value falls within a certain range, 
then the lower and upper bounds can be attained from simple division and multiplication 
of the original HEP value. 
Table 6.7 Guidelines followed to calculate uncertainty bounds 
Guide Line 
Estimated HEP < 0.001 
Estimated HEP from 
0.001 - 0.01 
Lower Bounds 
HEP/ 10 
HEP/ 3 
Upper Bounds 
HEP X 10 
HEP x3 
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Estimated HEP > 0.01 HEP/ 5 HEPx 5 
For example, the final HEP value for the task of "checking lines for fluid and 
pressure" is 2.09x10-3. Given that this value is greater than 0.001 and less than 0.01, 
therefore according to the guide line, to calculate the uncertainty of this task, the HEP 
value must be divided by 3 to find the lower bound, and must by multiplied by 3 to find 
the upper bound. This gives the values of the uncertainty for the main task to be 6.96x104 
- 6.27x10·3. 
6.5.2 Calculating total human error probability 
The final step is to aggregate HEP values of each major task according to an ET. This 
final calculation represents the total HEP in the pump maintenance activity. Upon doing 
this, the final total HEP value is found to be 5.7244xl0·2• This indicates that during the 
process of the pre and post-maintenance, the probability of an error occurring that would 
lead to the eventual failure in restoring a pump back to the service is roughly 5.72% with 
an uncertainty bound of 1.1448x 1 o·2 - 1.1452x 1 o·'. 
6.6 Incorporation of RFID 
In this step, the RFID technology is incorporated in the present case study in order to 
study the applicability of RFID technology to reduce the human error. The assessor 
reviewed the applications of the RFID technology with respect to the present case study 
and identified the potential areas where it could be successfully applied. Table 6.8 lists 
the tasks where RFID technology was used; the reduction of the nominal HEP was judged 
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subjectively considering the features of the RFID technology. The recalculated HEP 
values are also shown in Table 6.8. 
Table 6.8 Final HEP values after considering RFID system 
Main Activities HEP 
1.0 Prepare work 
1.2 Identify equipment affected l.OOx 1 o-5 
Rank fluid contained within 
1.4 pump 2.25xl o-
3 
2.0 Isolate Pump 
Check bleeds/vents for 
1.69x10-3 2.2 
obstructions 
2.3 Close isolation valves 5.66xl0-4 
2.6 Drain lines 1.28x1 o-4 
2.7 Purge lines 1.28x10-4 
2.9 Open all drains of affected 6.06x10-4 
equipment possible 
2.12 
Isolate, lock, and tag motor 1.66x10-3 
from control center 
3.0 Re-connect pump 
3.1 Check lines and equipment for 1.69x10-3 
obstructions 
3.2 
Remove locks and tags from 
valves, leaving valves closed 1.125x10-3 
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The new total HEP value calculated considering these reductions is 4.6342x 1 o-2 or 
4.63% error with an uncertainty of bound of 2.145x 1 o-2 - 2.089x 1 o-1• Therefore, in this 
case study, the use ofRFID technology yields a net human error reduction of 1.09%. 
6.7 Conclusions 
An integrated new approach to quantify the human errors occurred in maintenance 
procedures of an offshore condensate pump has been developed. A developed 
methodology solves one of the most important challenges of using THERP solely which 
is the availability of nominal HEPs in the THERP guidelines for all of the considered task 
elements. As a result, wherever these data are unavailable, the SLIM has been used to 
generate the required data. In the first step, the human error in the pump maintenance task 
is quantified without utilizing the RFID technology based tools which is estimated as 
5.72%. Afterwards, the application of RFID technology is considered in order to 
minimize the probability of human error and to investigate the applicability of the system 
in maintenance procedures. The total HEP of the pump maintenance task with the 
incorporation of RFID technology is calculated as 4.63%, which yields a net of HEP 
reduction of 1.09%. The result demonstrates the potential of RFID technology to human 
error management in the maintenance activity. Although the reduction is not very 
significant in the present case study, the higher degree of HEP reduction may be possible 
depending on the maintenance activity in offshore oil and gas facilities. Application of a 
developed methodology to a considered case study in this research also demonstrates that 
the proposed integration of SLIM in the THERP framework has made the application of 
THERP much quicker and simpler. 
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7 Effects of Cold Environments on Human Reliability Assessment in 
Offshore Oil and Gas Facilities t 
Preface 
A version of this manuscript has been accepted for publication in the Journal of Human 
Factors and Ergonomics Society. Noroozi was the first author and the main lead on the 
work. The co-authors Drs. Khan and MacKinnon supervised the first author. They helped 
to develop the methodology and cross-checked the analysis of the manuscript. The co-
author Dr. Abbassi cross-checked and helped collect data from industry while the co-
author Dr. Khakzad helped developing event tree and doing the event tree analysis. 
Noroozi performed the analysis and prepared the first draft of the manuscript while the 
co-authors Drs. Khan and MacKinnon reviewed the manuscript and provided the 
necessary suggestions. 
Abstract 
This research focuses on the effects of cold, harsh environments on the reliability of 
human performance. As maritime operations move into cold arctic and Antarctic 
environments, decision makers must be able to realize how human performance is 
affected by cold, and adjust management and operational tools and strategies accordingly. 
This research provides a proof of concept that the risk of operations in cold environments 
is greater than those performed in temperate climates, and develops guidance regarding 
how this risk can be assessed. A methodology by application of HEART is developed to 
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assess the effects of cold on the likelihood of human error in offshore oil and gas 
facilities. This methodology is applied to the post-maintenance tasks of a pump in 
offshore oil and gas facility to investigate as to how management, operational and 
equipment issues must be considered in risk analysis and prediction of human error in 
cold environments. The present work demonstrates a significant difference between the 
HEPs and related risk in normal conditions, as opposed to cold and harsh environments. 
This study also highlights that the cognitive performances of human is the most important 
factors affected by the cold and harsh conditions. 
7.1 Introduction 
The study of human factor is an important area of process engmeenng which 
includes the systematic application of information related to human characteristics and 
behavior to improve the performance of human-machine systems (McSweeney et al., 
2008). According to Dhillon & Liu (2006), poor design factors in equipment, 
maintenance, and work layout, and difficulties faced by workers, such as improper work 
tools and overstressed-induced fatigue are the main factors contributing to error 
occurrence in maintenance procedures. Other contributing factors include environmental 
factors such as humidity, lighting, and temperature,. Improper training, the use of 
outdated maintenance manuals and lack of proper experience also cause a high numbers 
of maintenance errors. On the other hand, there are few factors to improve the work 
environment such as training the personnel, ensuring emotional stability and hiring 
workers with a greater aptitude for their environment, improving team work, and boosting 
morale. 
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Nelson (1996) argued that accident occurrence due to maintenance activities as 
well as over speed protection equipment should be taken into consideration in the 
industry. Balkey (1996), however, asserted that risk-based inspection procedures and 
human error procedures in fossil fuel plants must be considered when conducting 
inspection procedures. Further data is provided by Eves (1985) on accidents in the 
chemical manufacturing industry during maintenance. 
Researchers concluded that collecting samples of the different types of human 
errors and interactions can be helpful in preventing such errors in future. In this way, 
investigations on human error have been carried out to explain the role of human error in 
maintenance, repairable systems, inspection process and system performance (Carr & 
Christer, 2003; Gramopadhye & Drury, 2000; Ramalhoto, 1999; Dhillon & Yang, 1993). 
Human errors in maintenance procedures cannot be neglected and several methodologies 
have been developed to estimate the human error in maintenance procedures. However, 
there is no study available at present to quantify the HEPs of maintenance activities at 
arctic conditions. The dissimilar characteristics of arctic regions and their effect on 
human performance during maintenance procedures can be a considerable motivator to 
develop a methodology to account for the effect of cold and harsh environments in final 
HEPs estimation. 
Numerous challenges related to the operation of equipment, the systems, the 
structure and the safety equipment performed under cold and harsh environments have 
been previously explained (Strauch, 2004; Parsons, K. (2003). Some of the effects of cold 
temperatures and harsh environments on human performance are listed in Table 7.1. 
However, there is a lack of methodology at present to fully consider the effects of cold on 
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the probabilities of human error. This will lead to underestimating the values of human 
error probabilities (HEPs) by neglecting the essential factors that should be evaluated 
because of the cold conditions, and to decline of the overall reliability in process 
facilities. 
Table 7.1 General Cold Environmental Factors Affecting Human Performance (Bercha et 
al., 2003; 2004; Forsius et al., 1970) 
Stressors 
Cold Temperature 
Ice Ad-freeze 
Combined Weather Effects 
Marine Ice 
Low visibility 
Stress 
Details 
Breathing difficulty 
Muscular stiffness 
Frost bite 
Lowered metabolism 
Hypothermia 
Bulky clothing 
Stiffness of suits impairing movement 
Incapacitates mechanisms 
Slippery surfaces 
Adds weight/mass 
Wind, snow, waves-impair HP 
Precludes rapid decent to sea level 
Unstable for locomotion 
Ice, fog, lack of solar illumination 
Frost on windows, visors, glasses 
Fear of unknown 
Disorientation 
When deep body temperatures begin to fall below the normal resting values, 
hypothermia starts (Makinen, 2006). Metabolism is increased to produce more body heat, 
and as cooling continues, a person will start to shiver, which is a visible sign that body 
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cooling has continued beyond a comfortable level. By increasing metabolic rates, the 
amount of time a person can sustain work will be reduced (Legland et al., 2006). Motor 
control becomes impaired as a body cools, making an operator vulnerable to physical 
injuries. Extremely cold conditions adversely affect mental skills and cognition (Bourne 
& Yaroush, 2003). As operational temperatures decrease, the frequency of cognitive error 
increases. Operations at cold temperatures coupled with physical distracters such as noise 
or moving environments will affect the quality of perception, memory, and reasoning, 
further increasing the risk of error in decision-making (Legland et al., 2006). Specific 
effects of extreme environments on human performance are highlighted in Karwowski, 
2001 and Hoffman, 2002, and must be considered when assessing task performance, 
operating procedures and equipment design. 
Physical performance decrements because of exposure to cold weather can have 
profound effects upon the way a task is completed. Direct deficits include loss of strength, 
mobility and balance. While thermal protective clothing may mitigate the 
neurophysiologic responses, indirectly protective clothing could affect manual 
performance due to reduced strength producing capacity, a decrease in mobility, and 
inability to perceive external elements or cues. Investigations have reported minimal 
decreases in simple reaction time (except in the most extreme conditions) (Enander, 1987; 
Hoffman, 2002). However, for more complex tasks, cold environments have resulted in 
poorer performances. It is reported that reduced in reaction speed were observed among 
subjects beginning at an ambient temperature of - 26°C with a wind speed of 10 mph or 
greater (Hoffman, 2002). Outcomes also included: an increased number of errors, 
increased speed of reporting incorrect responses, increased numbers of false alarms and a 
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decreased ability to inhibit incorrect responses. Visual-motor tracking performance is 
markedly and immediately impaired in the cold. Upon exposure of a person fully dressed 
in arctic clothing to extremely cold air temperatures, a significant reduction in 
performance is occurred compared to the exposure to the normal temperatures (Parsons, 
2003). Extreme cold stress may produce confusion and impaired consciousness. 
Researchers demonstrated the increase in the number of errors when performing at the 
temperature of 5°C, compared to the performance in 22°C ambient temperature (Olden & 
Benoit, 1996; Hoffman, 2002; Pilcher et al., 2002; Wright et al., 2002). One of the major 
consequences of working in cold and harsh environments includes fatigue, both physical 
and cognitive. Fatigue continues to be either a main cause or a contributory factor to 
casualties and damage to the environment and property. Fatigue impacts on individual 's 
skills to react, recognize and interpret stimuli in the work environment. Fatigue also 
encourages the apathy status and decreases motivation at work contributing consequently 
toward poor performance (Xhelilaj & Lapa, 201 0). 
Considering the effects of cold on various features of human performance, a 
methodology is developed in this research by particularization of the HEART for cold 
environments. The proposed methodology will help the assessors to investigate the 
probabilities of human error more accurately in cold conditions understanding of which 
will help to improve the overall reliability of offshore oil and gas facilities in cold and 
harsh environments. 
7.2 A developed methodology applied in cold environments 
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HEART is a technique widely used in human reliability assessment to compare 
HEPs, based on the degree of error recovery. In a standard HEART methodology, the 
specification of a particular scenario based on the present conditions of a facility (or a 
part of the facility) is required. Thus, observing the specific conditions such as cold 
temperature, high speed wind, lack of visibility, and slippery is required for describing an 
accurate scenario to be applicable in cold and harsh environments. Considering the above 
factors is one of the reasons that which distinguishes the methodology of this work from 
the standard HEART methodology. HEART methodology has been previously used 
extensively to estimate the HEPs in normal operating conditions (Kirwan et al., 2007; 
Casamirra et al., 2009; Noroozi et al., 2012). For using this methodology, after 
considering a particular scenario, all of sub-tasks that would be required by the operator 
to complete within each task in the considered scenario will be investigated. 
Subsequently, a nominal human unreliability score (Kirwan et al. , 1996) for the particular 
task is determined. In the standard HEART, the estimator used recommended values 
ranging from 5th to 95th percentile boundaries of nominal human unreliability for a 
particular task (typically the mean values). However, because of the harsh and cold 
conditions, the modified methodology used the values of the 95th percentile, which is 
considered as a worst case scenario. 
By identifying the particular scenario, the assessor will determine the factors that 
influence the HEP, known as Error Producing Conditions (EPCs). For illustration 
purposes, only three to four EPCs of higher nominal amounts, according to the considered 
scenario, have been selected to estimate the final HEPs. In the developed methodology, 
the EPCs are divided into four different categories of physical, cognitive, 
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instrumentations, and management (Table 7.2). These four major categories have been 
derived based on previous work on the effect of cold and harsh conditions on producing 
errors in human performances (Bourne & Yaroush, 2003; Forsius et al., 1970; Hoffman, 
2002; Mekjavic et al., 1988; Orden & Benoit, 1996; Staal, 2004). The EPCs, related to 
each category in the modified methodology is added to the main EPCs which are similar 
to the normal conditions and then used in the final estimation of HEPs. 
Table 7.2 EPCs in HEART methodology (P: Physical C: Cognitive. 1: Instrumentations. 
M: Management) 1 
Error-
producing 
condition 
Maximum predicted nominal 
amount by which umeliability 
might change going from 'good' 
conditions to 'bad' 
1 
2 
Unfamiliarity with a situation which is potentially important but 
which only occurs infrequently or which is novel 
A shortage of time available for error detection and correction 
(P) 
3 A low signal-to-noise ratio (C) 
4 A means of suppressing or overriding information or features which 
is too easily accessible 
5 No means of conveying spatial and functional information to 
operators in a form which they can readily assimilate 
6 A mismatch between an operator's model of the world and that 
imagined by the designer (C, M) 
7 No obvious means of reversing an unintended action 
8 A channel capacity overload, particularly one caused by 
simultaneous presentation of non-redundant information 
9 A need to unlearn a technique and apply one which requires the 
application of an opposing philosophy 
1 0 The need to transfer specific knowledge from task to task 
without loss (C) 
11 Ambiguity in the required performance standards 
12 A mismatch between perceived and real risk 
13 Poor, ambiguous or ill-matched system feedback (C, I) 
14 No clear direct and timely confirmation of an intended action from 
the Portion of the system over which control is to be exerted 
15 Operator inexperienced (e.g. a newly qualified tradesman, but not 
an 'expert') 
16 An impoverished quality of information conveyed by procedures 
and person-person interaction 
17 
11 
10 
9 
8 
8 
8 
6 
6 
5.5 
5 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
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17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
Little or no independent checking or testing of output (P, I, M) 
A conflict between immediate and long-term objectives 
No diversity of information input for veracity checks 
A mismatch between the educational achievements level of an 
individual and the requirements of the task 
An incentive to use other more dangerous procedures (P, C) 
Little opportunity to exercise mind and body outside the immediate 
confines of the job 
Unreliable instrumentation (1, M) 
A need for absolute judgments which are beyond the 
capabilities or experience of an operator (C) 
Unclear allocation of function and responsibility 
No obvious way to keep track of progress during an activity 
A danger that finite physical capabilities will be exceeded (P) 
Little or no intrinsic meaning in a task 
High-level emotional stress 
Evidence of ill-health amongst operatives, especially fever (P) 
Low work force morale (C, M) 
Inconsistency of meaning of displays and procedures 
A poor or hostile environment (below 75% of health or life-
threatening severity) (P) 
Prolonged inactivity or highly repetitious cycling of low mental 
workload tasks 
Disruption of normal work-sleep cycles (C, M) 
Task pacing caused by the intervention of others 
Additional team members over and above those necessary to 
perform task normally and satisfactorily 
3 
2.5 
2.5 
2 
2 
1.8 
1.6 
1.6 
1.6 
1.4 
1.4 
1.4 
1.3 
1.2 
1.2 
1.2 
1.15 
x 1.1 for first half 
hour 
x 1.05 for each hour 
there after 
1.1 
1.06 
x 1.03 per 
additional 
man 
3 8 Age of personnel performing perceptual tasks 1. 02 
The following variables were assessed for impact due to operations in cold environments. These 
variables were considered to influence operator physical or cognitive performance and/or effect 
management decision-making. 
Each EPC has a maximum nominal amount, which should be inserted in Equation 1 as the 
Maximum effect. The next step is to assess the proportion of affect (APOA), which is 
weighted for each chosen EPC based on its importance. Accordingly, each EPC is 
individually weighted from 0 to 1 (Williams, 1988). 
Assessed Effect = (Maximum effect - 1) * APOA + 1 (1) 
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Equation 1 can be applied to calculate the effect of each EPC and its relevant 
APOA on the HEP. The HEP of each task is calculated by multiplying the selected HEP 
with the nominal amount of APOA related to each EPC (Williams, 1988). The 
methodology developed in this research to tailor the HEART methodology to cold and 
harsh environments is demonstrated in Figure 7.1 . 
Identifying the full range of sub tasks in a 
part of offshore facility 
l 
Determining a nominal human 
unreliability score 
l 
Identifying Error Producing Conditions 
(EPC) considering the cold conditions 
~ 
Assessing proportion of effect of each 
EPC onHEP 
. ... .. . _.; Considering the particular scenario including 
~ the specific conditions of cold and harsh 
: environments 
rl' ......... .. . ... ... .. .... . .. . . ........ . .. ................... .. ...... . 
........ ~ Applying the 95th nominal amount to be l 
~ considered the adverse effect of harsh and ~ 
~ cold environments ~ 
.................................................................... : 
.................................................................... 
. . 
. Dividing the EPCs to four different categories 
.......•. : ~ and considered each category in the final : 
; calculation of HEPs ; 
. . 
..................................................................... 
........ .,.l Estimating the effect of the each EPC 
: between 0 to 1 on final value HEP based on 
~ the particular conditions in specified scenario 
Figure 7.1 A modified methodology developed to calculate the HEP 
7.3 Application of the developed methodology 
To demonstrate the variation in HEPs by using the developed methodology, both in 
harsh and cold environments and the normal conditions, it is applied to post-maintenance 
procedures of a condensate pump in offshore oil and gas facility. It is a particular type 
of pump applied to the condensate water produced in an HV AC (heating or cooling), 
condensing boiler furnace or steam system. The regular maintenance activities of a pump 
in offshore oil and gas can be divided using three different categories namely pre-
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maintenance, maintenance, and post-maintenance. The focus of the case considered in 
this study is on the post-maintenance activities. These activities have been developed in 
conjunction with the Single Buoy Moorings (SBM) Company, Nova Scotia, Canada. The 
scenarios were developed based on maintenance reports of the offshore platform selected 
based on the most frequent occurring scenarios. 
7.3.1 Selected scenario for post maintenance activities 
After each maintenance service, the operators and engineers must continue with 
post-maintenance activities, since production must not be halted for extended periods of 
time. These activities focus on returning the system to normal operation. The following 
information provides characteristics of the selected scenario in this work: 
1. Some junior operators have logged insufficient training hours. Because of the high 
amount of work undertaken, the pressure is high, leading to intense fatigue for the 
workers; 
2. An inexperienced workforce engineer is responsible for ensuring site readiness for 
reinstatement. The site engineer is using a poorly written report to perform an 
inspection and to ensure that the site and equipment are in safe conditions; 
3. The responsible incoming assistant lacks adequate information regarding returning 
keys and supplying certificates; 
4. The system feedback is unreliable; 
5. The supervisor is too busy to provide complete supervision for the procedure; 
6. There is insufficient time, due to the urgency of starting operations to prevent 
extra costs. 
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Generally, there are time constraints related to further extending the shutdown 
acti viti es. 
The above mentioned scenano is considered in the calculation of the HEPs in 
normal conditions. The similar scenario is applied to calculate the HEPs in cold and harsh 
environments. The particular specifications of these regions listed in Table 7.1 have been 
included. Post-maintenance work requires sequentially executed activities. Factors such 
as operator experience, time constraints, administrative procedures, and high work 
demands can lead to task error. The post-maintenance scenarios for the considered 
procedures of a condensate pump are indicated in Tables 7.3 and 7.4. 
Table 7.3 Activities required during post-maintenance 
Sub Activity Activity 
1.1 Check lines and equipment for obstructions 
1. Re-connect 1.2 Remove mechanical isolation/connect lines to 
pump pump 
1.3 Remove locks and tags from valves, leaving 
valves closed 
2. Workforce 
Supervisor 
(WFS) ensure 
site and 
equipment left in 
safe state 
3. WFS return 
keys and 
certificates 
4. Permit to 
4.1 Return lock-out keys 
Work 4.2 
Give worksite authority back to AA (Area 
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Coordinator Authority) 
(PTWC) ensure 
site is ready for 4.3 
reinstatement (Supervisors) Document reinstatement 
5. PTWC&AA 
finalize PTW 
6.1 Test pressure 
6. Open valves 6.2 Remove air from lines and pump 
and reinstate 
pump 6.3 Open valves, fill pump and test for leaks 
6.4 Start pump 
Table 7.4 The HEP calculation of sub-activity 1.1 due to the effect of cold and 
harsh environments on physical performances 
Re-connect Pump Activity: 
1.0 
Sub-
activity 1.1 
Check lines and equipment for obstruction (arctic conditions: effect on physical performances) 
Generic 
task 
E 
Generic 
error NO. 
probability 
0.045 2 
11 
17 
21 
27 
30 
33 
Total assessed EPC effect 
HEP 
7 .3.2 HEP calculation 
EPCs 
Time shortage 
Ambiguity in standards 
Little or no independent checking 
An incentive to use other more 
dangerous procedures 
A danger that finite physical 
capabilities will be exceeded 
Evidence of ill-health amongst 
operatives 
A poor or hostile envirorunent 
Total Assess Assessed HEART proportion 
effect 
effect of effect 
11 0.01 1.1 
5 0.01 1.04 
3 0.05 1.1 
2 0.05 1.05 
1.4 0.05 1.02 
1.2 0.05 1.01 
1.15 0.05 1.0075 
1.371433 
6.17E-02 
The developed methodology is applied to calculate the HEPs for all of the above 
activities in a considered scenario. A detailed calculation for the sub-activity 1.1, "Check 
lines and equipment for obstructions" because of the effect of cold on physical 
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performances of employees during maintenance procedures of a pump is explained in 
Table 7.4 as an example. 
Table 7.5 Human error probabilities in normal conditions 
Activities HEP 
1.0 Re-connect pump 
1.1 Check lines and equipment for obstructions 8.01E-03 
1.2 Remove mechanical isolation/connect lines to 1.45E-01 pump 
1.3 Remove locks and tags from valves, leaving 8.93E-03 
valves closed 
2.0 WFS ensure site and equipment left in safe 8.98E-04 
state 
3.0 WFS return keys & certificates 6.55E-02 
4.0 PTWC ensure site ready for reinstatement 
4.1 Return lock-out keys 7.06E-02 
4.2 Give worksite authority back to AA 8.90E-04 
4.3 (Supervisors) Document reinstatement 1.57E-01 
5.0 PTWC & AA finalize PTW 6.73E-02 
6.0 Open valves and reinstate pump 
6.1 Test Pressure 8.01E-03 
6.2 Remove air from lines and pump 9.16E-04 
6.3 Open valves, fill pump and test for leaks 7.93E-03 
6.4 Start pump 6.30E-02 
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1.0 
The first step is to determine a Generic Task (GT). The upper-bond values of GT 
considered for sub-activity 1.1 is "E". For the type "E" task, the nominal unreliability is 
0.045. Based on Table 7.2, the EPCs and their maximum predicted nominal amounts 
related to this sub-activity have been selected based on the scenario illustrated above. The 
EPCs from Table 7.2 related to the effect of cold and harsh environments on the major 
human performances (cognitive and physical), as well as management and 
instrumentations, have been adopted for each category and added to the related EPCs. A 
proportionate weight factor is applied when an EPC is considered. This is demonstrated in 
the column labelled "Assess Proportion of Effect" in Table 7.4 for the sub-activity 1.1. As 
illustrated in Table 7.4, the values of0.01 for the EPCs of2 and 11 , and 0.05 for the other 
EPCs, are selected based on the degree of effectiveness of each EPC on human error. 
Based on Equation 1, the assessed effect of each EPCs is calculated. Finally, the 
HEP is calculated based on the effect of cold and harsh environments on physical 
performances for sub-activity 1.1 as 6.17 E-02. The similar process is adopted to estimate 
the HEPs of different sub-activities in normal condition (Table 7.5), and also by 
considering the effect of cold and harsh environments on human performances (cognitive 
and physical), decision making (management), and instrumentation (Table 7.6) used in 
post-maintenance activities of a pump. 
Table 7.6 Human error probabilities in cold conditions 
HEP physical HEP cognitive HEPinstrumentations HEP ma nagement 
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1.1 6.17E-2 1.54E-1 6.71E-2 8.79E-2 
1.2 4.05E-1 7.46E-1 4.4E-1 5.77E-1 
1.3 6.88E-2 1.18E-l 7.48E-2 9.81E-2 
1.21E-2 3.01E-2 1.32E-2 1.72E-2 2.0 
3.0 1.7E-1 4.23E-l 1.85E-l 2.42E-1 
4.0 
4.1 1.83E-1 4.56E-l 1.99E-l 2.61E-1 
4.2 1.2E-2 2.99E-2 1.3E-2 1.71E-2 
4.3 5.65E-1 7.67E-1 5.81E-1 7.61E-1 
5.0 1.75E-1 4.35E-1 1.9E-1 2.49E-1 
6.0 
6.1 7.32E-2 1.54E-1 6.71E-2 8.79E-2 
6.2 1.44E-2 3.01E-2 1.32E-2 1.72E-2 
6.3 7.25E-2 1.52E-l 6.64E-2 8.71E-2 
6.4 1.64E-1 4.07E-l 1.78E-1 2.33E-1 
The above method is the simplest formula to be used to obtain HEPs. HEP 
calculation still uses the empirical formula, where more sophistication is required. 
Simplistic approach of human error quantification suggested that more quantitative 
approach such as Markov models could be used (Sridharan & Mohanavadivu, 1997). 
However, it should be noted that human behaviour or human actions are highly variable 
and unpredictable. Therefore, the use of empirical formula is still preferred to statistical 
technique. 
7 .3.3 HEP Comparison 
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7.3.3.1 Statistical Comparison 
To examine the impressions cold and harsh environments might leave on HEPs, if 
any, the normalized relative differences in HEP values calculated in cold and normal 
environments are obtained (Table 7.7) and appropriate statistical analyses are applied. To 
this end, the normality of the HEPs in each column is checked. As the HEPs in each 
column are not distributed normally, the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test is applied to define 
the significant difference between each column of the HEPs, which resulted from harsh 
environments with those which resulted from normal conditions. 
Table 7.7 Relative human error probabilities in cold and normal conditions ((HEPcotd-
HEP nonnat) / HEP nonnat) 
HEP physical HEP cognitive HEPinstrumentations HEP management 
1.0 
1.1 6.7 18.2 7.37 9.97 
1.2 1.79 4.14 2.03 2.97 
1.3 6.7 12.21 7.37 9.98 
2.0 12.47 32.5 13.69 18.15 
3.0 1.59 5.45 1.82 2.69 
4.0 
4.1 1.59 5.45 1.81 2.69 
4.2 12.48 32.5 13.6 18.21 
4.3 2.59 3.88 2.7 3.84 
5.0 1.6 5.46 1.82 2.69 
6.0 
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6.1 8.1 18.22 7.37 9.97 
6.2 14.7 31.8 13.4 17.77 
6.3 8.1 18.16 7.37 9.98 
6.4 1.6 5.46 1.82 2.69 
It is a non-parametric statistical hypothesis used to compare two related groups of 
data to assess whether their populations mean ranks differ (Vaughan, 2001 ). The 
statistical analysis is also used to define the difference between the columns of HEPs 
including the effect of cold on human performance (cognitive and physical), 
instrumentations, and management. Thus, the Friedman Test (with considering post-hoc 
tests) was used to investigate the differences between the four considered categories. The 
Friedman test compares the mean ranks between the related groups and indicates how the 
groups differ, although not demonstrating exactly where those differences lay. As a result, 
to examine where the differences occur, the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test was used to 
combine of the considered groups (cognitive with physical, cognitive with management, 
etc.) 
The results obtained by applying the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test to the Z-scores 
and P-values (Devore, 2008) demonstrate that there are statistically significant differences 
between the HEPs received from the effect of cold on physical performance and normal 
condition (Z = -3.180, P = 0.001 ), cognitive performances and normal conditions (Z = -
3.181 , P = 0.001), management and normal conditions (Z = -2.691 , P = 0.007), and also 
instrumentations with normal conditions (Z = -3.181, P = 0.007). These results highlight 
the necessity of re-evaluating the human errors due to the effect of cold and harsh 
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conditions, increasing the overall reliability of maintenance procedures in arctic and sub-
arctic regions. The results obtained from the Fiedman Test show that there is a 
statistically significant difference in HEPs depending on which type of effects are 
considered due to the cold and harsh conditions (x2(2) = 32.908, P = 0.00). Post-hoc 
analysis with Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests was conducted with a Bonferroni correction 
applied, resulting in a significance level set at P < 0.0125. Median (IQR) perceived effort 
levels for the physical, cognitive, instrumentations, and management include 7.32 E-02 
(3.81 E-02 to 1.79 E-01), 1.54 E-01 (7.41 E-02 to 4.56 E-01), 7.48 E-02 (3.98 E-02 and 
1.95 E-01), and 8.79 E-02 (4.66 E-02 and 2.46 E-01), respectively. There are no 
significant differences between HEPs received from the effect of cold on physical 
performance and management (Z = -2.272, P = 0.023), physical performance and 
instrumentations (Z = -2.064, P = 0.039), and instrumentations and management (Z = -
2.273, P = 0.023). However, there are statistically significant differences between the 
HEPs received from the effect of cold on physical and cognitive performances (Z = -
3.180, P = 0.001), cognitive performances and management (Z = -3.182, P = 0.001), and 
also between cognitive performances and instrumentations (Z = -3.1 85, P = 0.001 ). 
7 .3.3.2 Risk-based Comparison 
Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) has played an important role in identifying major 
risks and maintaining safety in process facilities. QRA includes several steps such as 
hazard identification, accident modeling, consequence analysis, and risk estimation. The 
results of QRA can either be used in assisting decision-makers with risk levels of 
different plans or to improve the safety measures of facilities. Event tree is a technique 
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widely used in QRA to explore and calculate the probabilities of potential consequences 
of an initiated undesired event given subsequent failures/successes of safety barriers 
(Khakzad et al, 2012; Khakzad et al, 2013). In this study, to investigate the effect of cold 
and harsh environments on HEPs, a risk assessment has been conducted to compare the 
values of risks, which resulted from human-error-induced accidents both in normal and 
cold environments. It should be noted that for cold conditions, the risk analysis is 
separately performed for physical, cognitive, instrumentations, and management, 
resulting in four different values, respectively. 
Considering the pump post-maintenance as the initiating event, the event tree in 
Figure 7.2 is developed. Based on field studies and expert opinions, the most probable 
accident scenario following a human error in post-maintenance procedure of the pump 
would be a release of flammable liquid. Meeting an ignition source, a pool fire would 
occur which can be extinguished only if a water sprinkler system is activated by a 
flame/smoke detector (Figure 7.2). 
Pump 
maintenance 
(f) 
Human 
error 
(HEP) 
Release 
(X2) 
Ignition 
(X3) 
Flame/ 
Smoke 
detector 
(X4) 
Water 
sprinkler 
(XS) 
C1 
C2 
C3 
C4 
cs 
C6 
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Figure 7.2 Event tree of pump post- maintenance 
The probabilities of the components of the event tree have been indicated in Table 
7.8 (Khakzad et al, 2012; Khakzad et al, 2013). However, it is worth noting that the 
probability of the top event "Human error", HEP, in Figure 7.2 for normal and cold 
conditions has been derived using Tables 7.5 and 7.6, respectively, assuming that the 
activities and sub-activities are independent and act like a series system (the worst-case 
scenario). Thus, HEP can be calculated using Equation 2. 
n 
HEP = 1 -IT (1 - P;) (2) 
i~ l 
Where P; is the probability of each activity (sub-activity). 
Table 7.8 Probabilities of event tree's components (Khakzad et al, 2012; Khakzad et al, 
2013) 
Top 
event 
F 
HEP 
X2 
X3 
X4 
xs 
Description 
Frequency of pump maintenance 
Human error probability for normal conditions and cold 
conditions including physical, cognitive, instrumentation, and 
management 
Occurrence probability of Release given a Human error 
Occurrence probability of Ignition given a Release 
Failure probability of Flame detector given a fire 
Failure probability of Water sprinkler given the operation of 
Flame detector 
Probability 
0.3 
Normal: 0 .472 
Cold: 0.913, 0.997, 
0.926 and 0 .982 
0.1 
0.1 
0.01 
0.04 
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Having the probabilities of top events, the probabilities of consequences can be 
calculated as demonstrated in the last five columns of Table 7.9. Using the consequence 
severity matrix (Appendix 7.1), the severity of each consequence can be determined 
(Column 3 of Table 7.9) based on the extent of its adverse effects such as causalities, 
environmental, and property damage. Assigning according monetary values to each 
consequence (column 4 of Table 7.9), the total amount of envisaged risk for the accident 
scenario in normal and cold conditions can be estimated (last raw ofTable 7.9). 
Table 7.9 Risk analysis of pump post-maintenance accident in normal and cold 
conditions 
Inde Severit Damage Normal 
Cold Condition P (Ci) 
Description condition 
X 
y (USD) Managem class P (Ci) Physical Cognitive Instrument 
ent 
C1 Safe condition 0 1.584 E-01 3.06 E-01 3.34 E-01 3.10 E-01 3.29E-OI 
C2 Mishap 0 1.274 E-01 2.46 E-01 2.68 E-01 2.50 E-01 2.64 E-01 
C3 Near miss 2 5 E +03 1.274 E-02 2.46 E-02 2.68 E-02 2.50 E-02 2.64 E-02 
Fire; 
Successful 
extinguishment; 250 E C4 Minor property 3 
+03 1.35 E-03 2.61 E-03 2.84 E-03 2.65 E-03 2.8 E-03 damage; 
Minor injury 
Fire; 
Unsuccessful 
extinguishment; 
C5 Major property 5 25 E +06 5.61 E-05 1.085 E- 1.183 E-04 1.099 E-04 1.165 E-damage; 04 04 
Major injury; 
possibility of 
death 
Fire; 
Unsuccessful 
extinguishment; 
C6 Major property 5 25 E +06 1.4 E-03 2.7 1 E-03 2.95 E-3 2.75 E-03 2.9 E-03 damage; 
Major injury; 
possibility of 
death 
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~----·-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total risk analysis based on dollar value 36,854 71,238 77,649 72,135 76,463 
It should be noted that C5 and C6 are of a similar severity; however, different 
probabilities arise from different causes. According to the event tree in Figure 7.2, C5 
would be a result if the Flame detector works, trying to activate the Water sprinkler. 
However, the Water sprinkler would not work due to its respective failure modes. On the 
other hand, in C6, the Water sprinkler would not work since it has not been activated 
because of the Flame detector failure as Water sprinkler is conditionally dependent on 
Flame detector. Thus, in either case, i.e., C5 and C6, a major accident would occur due to 
unsuccessful fire extinguishment. 
These results confirm that the cold and harsh conditions may have significant effects 
on producing human errors due to the effects on people's cognitive performance. The 
effects of repeated exposure of people to cold on cognitive performance have previously 
been discussed by Enander (1987), Pilcher (2002) and Makinen et al. (2006). 
7.4 Conclusion 
Investigation of the attributes of people in cold regions is required to accurately 
calculate the probability of error in human activities. A new methodology is developed in 
this research to estimate the HEPs in arctic environments for a specific task. In the new 
methodology, the upper bond values of human unreliability can be applied for the 
extreme environmental conditions. Also, the existence of specific EPCs related to arctic 
conditions such as high level emotional stress and a poor hostile environment may add 
more value to the methodology to calculate the HEPs. In the current study, HEPs in arctic 
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environments are calculated for each task for four different categories based on people's 
different attributes. 
Application of the methodology to post-maintenance of a pump demonstrated that 
the HEPs in arctic conditions are in the higher ranges as opposed to the normal 
conditions. Statistical analysis indicated that there exist significant differences between 
the HEPs in cold and harsh conditions and normal conditions. This is more evident for 
tasks for which cold temperatures, wind, ice, and visibility are able to decrease human 
performance. Further, the statistical analysis showed the effect of cold on people 
cognitive attributes such as attention, decision making, diagnosis, memory, and problem 
solving. This study confirmed that re-evaluating the HEPs is required for any scenario 
that occurs in harsh environments since the HEPs calculated in normal conditions are not 
compatible with similar scenarios in harsh and cold conditions. Comparing the risk of the 
normal and cold conditions including physical, cognitive, instrumentations, and 
management, the cognitive category is shown to have the highest risk values. Cognitive 
impairment can increase the HEP, and subsequently the risk. 
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Appendix 7.1 Consequence severity matrix (Kalantamia, 2009) 
Severity Dollar value Environmental Confidence or 
Asset Loss Human Loss 
Class equivalent Loss Reputation Loss 
No significant asset Minor mishap, No No remediation Get noticed by 
0 
loss injury required operating unit only 
Around the 
Minor injury, first Get noticed in the 
2 0.01 K-lOK 
Short term production 
aid attention 
operating unit, 
operation line/ line 
interrupti on 
required 
Easy recovery and 
supervisor 
remediation 
Equipment damage of One injuries Around the 
3 10 K- 500 K 
one unit requiring requiring hospital operating line, Easy 
Get noticed in plant 
repair/medium term attention however recovery and 
production interruption no threat to life remediation 
Equipment damage of More than one 
Get attention in the 
more than one unit injuries requiring Within plant, Short 
4 500 K- 5 M requiring repair/ long hospital attention term remediation 
industrial complex. 
Information shared 
term production however no threat effort 
interruption to life 
with neighboring units 
Multiple major Minor offsite 
Loss of one operating 
injuries, potential impact, 
5 5 M - 50 M disabilities, Remediation cost Local media coverage 
unit/ product 
potential threat to will be less than I 
life million 
Community 
50 M - 500 Loss of major portion 
One fatality and/or advisory issued, Regional media 
6 multiple injuries Remediation cost coverage a brief note 
M of equipment/ product 
with disabilities remain below 5 on national media 
million 
Loss of all equipment/ Community National media 
7 > 500M Multiple fatalities 
products evacuation for coverage, Brief note 
155 
longer period, 
Remediation cost 
in excess of 5 
million 
on international media 
8 The role of human error in risk analysis: application to pre and 
post-maintenance procedures of process facilities t 
Preface 
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Abstract: 
Human factors play an important role in the safe operation of a facility. Human factors 
include the systematic application of information about human characteristics and 
behavior to increase the safety of a process system. A significant proportion of human 
errors occur during the maintenance phase. However, evaluating human error in the 
maintenance phase has not been given the amount of attention it deserves. This research 
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focuses on a human factors analysis in pre- and post- pump maintenance operations. The 
procedures for removing process equipment from service (pre-maintenance) and returning 
the equipment to service (post-maintenance) are considered for possible failure scenarios. 
For each scenario, HEP is calculated for each activity using the SLIM. Consequences are 
also assessed in this methodology. The risk assessment is conducted for each component 
and the overall risk is estimated by adding individual risks. The present study is aimed at 
highlighting the importance of considering human error in quantitative risk analyses. The 
developed methodology has been applied to a case study of an offshore process facility. 
8.1 Introduction 
Human failure, human fault and human error all refer to different concepts; thus, it is 
necessary to differentiate among them to minimize their adverse effects. Human failure is 
due to massive errors that have far reaching consequences, often moral in nature and 
entirely inexcusable. Human fault refers to errors caused by negligence or intentional 
behavior, often punishable. Human error refers to common mistakes that are easily 
identified, diagnosed and generally excusable. An understanding of raw data, relevant 
data, and productive data and of what differentiates among them is important to 
understand these concepts. 
Human error is an important consideration in process industry. It includes the systematic 
application of information about human characteristics and behaviors to improve the 
performance of human-machine systems (1). HEP assessment techniques preliminary 
have been a focus of the nuclear industry and have developed expert judgment techniques 
such as SLIM, THERP, and Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique 
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(HEART). Incorporating HEPs in the development of operational procedures can 
significantly improve the overall reliability of the system (2). There have been efforts to 
assess HEPs using the aforementioned methods (3-5) while application to risk analysis 
has been limited (6). 
Since most activities in process industries involve human involvement in terms of labour 
force, monitoring, inspection, maintenance, supervision, management, and decision-
making, human errors seem inevitable. Errors can occur at any phase due to the 
performance of a wrong action or the failure to perform a necessary action. There are 
different sources for human error, including lack of training, poor equipment design, 
inadequate lighting, loud noise, inadequate work layout, improper tools, and poor 
operating procedures. As discussed by Dhillon (7), human error can be classified into six 
categories as: operation, assembly, design, inspection, installation, and maintenance. 
However, the effect of human errors on system maintenance vta pre- and post-
maintenance procedures and their contribution to the induced risk are the focus of this 
study. The particular area of application is offshore oil and gas process facility. 
There are several reasons why maintenance errors occur and include: poor work layout, 
poorly written maintenance procedures, complex maintenance tasks, harsh environments 
(i.e., temperature, humidity, and noise), fatigue, outdated maintenance manuals and 
inadequate training and experience (7). The importance of training and experience to 
reduce maintenance errors has been discussed by Dhillon (8). People with more 
experience, higher aptitude, greater emotional stability, fewer reports of fatigue, greater 
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satisfaction with the work group and higher moralities have less probability of making 
errors. 
Human error in maintenance activities has not received much attention. Recent studies 
have illustrated that most human errors occur in the inspection and maintenance phase, 
where workers clearly have an important role in keeping equipment in good working 
order (9-12). Raman et al. (13) developed guidelines to apply hazard identification 
techniques to maintenance procedures of offshore platforms, while Dhillon and Yang (14) 
developed a stochastic model to analyze the role of human error in reliability and 
availability of machines. 
Sanders and McCormick ( 15) outlined the types of human factors direct! y and indirect! y 
related to errors in maintenance. Further studies have also been conducted on the topic of 
system failure and human errors, using Markov models, stochastic models, and reliability 
models (7, 16-25). 
In the present study, a risk-based approach is presented and applied to offshore process 
facilities to investigate the role of human error in pre- and post-maintenance procedures. 
In the context of risk-based maintenance, the main focus has been on the application of 
risk as a tool to prioritize or optimize the maintenance plans and schedules which 
consequently helps to reduce the overall risk. This study is aimed at illustrating the role of 
human error in maintenance, which is likely to make a significant contribution to the 
overall risk by endangering the safety of the facility. 
8.2 Background 
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8.2.1 SLIM processes 
SLIM is a method for probabilistic reliability analysis (26) in which the preference for a 
set of options is quantified based on an expert judgment. Kirwan (27) proposed SLIM for 
HRA models. The applicability of SLIM in assessing human reliability has been derived 
via human performances affected by various factors. The additive influences of these 
factors, which are called PIF, are used to assess a human response (28), which is 
subsequently transformed into a HEP. The basic principle of this method is that the 
likelihood of a particular error occurring in a specific situation is associated with the 
combined effect of a relatively small set of PIFs (29). SLIM is a feasible approach and 
overcomes the problems of the potential inconsistency of multiple expert judgments or 
the problem with the systematic consideration of PIFs, and has been considered in 
different forms such as the SLIM-MAUD method (27). The SLIM procedure is illustrated 
in Figure 8.1. The SLI is calculated for each activity by using the Equation 1, in which 
SLis is the SLI of activity S. Rij is the scaled rating of task j on the PIF and Wi is the 
importance weight for the ith PIF. In SLIM error estimation (see Equation 2), a and b are 
considered as 0.5 and 10 E -04, respectively. 
SL!s = 'L.RuW; 
(1) 
Log(HEP) = a SLI + b 
(2) 
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Procedure Relationship 
SLI = R X w 
SLls= l)u x W 
HEP=ln (a SLI+b) 
Figure 8.1 The SLI methodology to calculate HEP (30) 
8.2.2 A risk-based approach 
Different human activities are carried out in pre- and post-maintenance procedures of a 
piece of equipment. A risk-based methodology is developed to assess the risk of these 
activities as illustrated in Figure 8.2, including SLIM, Risk Assessment, and Risk 
Management processes each of which comprises several steps. The HEPs are estimated 
by applying the SLIM process (Figure 8.1). After obtaining the HEPs based on a specific 
scenario, the final value of the risk is calculated by integrating the HEPs and consequence 
analysis results (Risk Assessment). If the risk exceeds predefined acceptable criteria, it 
will be reduced through either implementation of additional safety barriers or improving 
the performance of existing safety measures while re-quantifying the risk (Risk 
Management). This can also be accomplished by reducing the HEPs through re-designing 
the activities (31 ). 
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Figure 8.2 Risk-based methodology for minimizing human error. 
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The risk-based methodology developed in this study provides a tool for decision makers 
to investigate the severity of human error present in process facilities. Application of this 
methodology and redesigning of the activities which have high values of human errors 
may help to reduce the risk occurred due to the human performances in each pre- and post 
maintenance task. This finally increases the overall safety and reliability of the process 
facilities. However, it should be noted that the Risk Management process has not been 
considered in this present study. 
8.3 Application of the methodology 
8.3.1 Scenario development 
This section investigates the effect of human error on the risk analysis via a case-study 
from offshore process facility including a pump, a separator, and a valve during 
maintenance procedures. Generally, maintenance procedures can be divided into pre-
maintenance, maintenance, and post- maintenance (Step 1 in Figure 8.2). 
The main focus of this research is on pre- and post-maintenances which are the same for 
all the above-mentioned components. For each category, different activities should be 
assessed to calculate HEPs. The most frequent scenarios are developed based on 
maintenance reports of offshore platform. 
8.3.2 Pre-maintenance activities 
When the scenario is developed, the human related activities and the probability of error 
for each activity is identified (Steps 2 and 3 in Figure 8.2). Different activities and tasks 
are identified for pre-maintenance procedure and are presented in Table 8.1. The first 
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major activity involves the preparation tasks which require removing the component from 
service. The second activity describes the tasks involved in removing the component from 
service, so that maintenance can take place. 
Table 8.1 Activities during pre-maintenance 
1.0 Prepare work 
1.1 (Area Authority) Prepare work order 
1.2 Apply for permit to work 
1.3 Perform equipment diagnostics 
1.4 Identify equipment affected and tags used 
1.5 Perform risk assessment of activity 
1.6 Check work order and ensure no conflict of operation or other work 
1.7 Determine and certify required isolations 
1.8 (Permit to work coordinator) Obtain keys and certificates required 
1.9 (Area Authority) Authorize work 
1.10 (PTWC) Assign lockout box and give keys to supervisors affected 
by isolation 
1.11 Perform and document initial gas test 
1.1 2 Rank fluid contained within component 
1.13 Determine size of inlet and outlet lines from component 
1.14 Identify most appropriate isolation method 
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1.15 (OIM) Approve work activity 
1.16 (Workforce supervisor) Hold toolbox meeting 
1.17 Place PTW on permit board with copy displayed at work site 
2.0 Isolate the component 
2.1 Check lines for fluid and pressure 
2.2 Check bleeds/vents for obstruction 
2.3 Close isolation valves 
2.4 Lock and tag isolation valves 
2.5 Depressurize lines 
2.6 Drain lines 
2.7 Purge lines 
2.8 Perform pressure test & isolation leak test 
2.9 Open all drains of affected equipment possible 
2. 10 Perform mechanical isolation (fit slip plates, disconnect lines, etc.) 
2.11 Re-pressurize lines 
2.12 Isolate, lock and tag motor from control centre 
2.13 Test motor for power 
2.14 Revalidate permit with supervisors 
2.15 Break containment 
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2.16 Continue testing pressure and isolation at intervals 
8.3.3 Post-maintenance activities 
The next step is to develop post-maintenance activities (Table 8.2). Activity 3 in Table 
8.2 explains the re-connection of the component to the operating system, while Activities 
4 to 7 explains the preparations for returning the component to active service. Activity 8 
describes the re-activation of the component. 
Table 8.2 Activities during post-maintenance 
3.0 Re-connect 
3.1 Check lines and equipment for obstructions 
3.2 Remove mechanical isolation/connect lines 
3.3 Remove locks and tags from valves, leaving valves 
closed 
4.0 (WFS) Ensure site and equipment left in safe state 
5.0 (WFS) Return keys & certificates 
6.0 (PTWC) Ensure site ready for reinstatement 
6.1 Return lock-out keys 
6.2 Give worksite authority back to Area Authority 
6.3 (Supervisors) Document reinstatement 
7.0 (PTWC & Area Authority) Close Permit to Work 
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8.0 Open valves and reinstate 
8.1 Test Pressure 
8.2 Remove air from lines 
8.3 Open valves, fill and test for leaks 
8.4 Start 
8.3.4 Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs) 
PIPs may be described as basic human error tendencies and the creation of error- likely 
situations. They help to describe the likelihood of error or ineffective due to human 
performance. PIPs such as the quality of procedures, level of stress, and effectiveness of 
training will vary on a continuum from the best practicable (e.g. an ideally designed 
training program based on a proper training needs analysis) to worst possible 
(corresponding to no training program at all). There is a direct correlation between the 
PIPs and performance, meaning that if PIPs are optimal, performance will be optimal and 
consequently the likelihood of error will be minimized. The list of PIPs can be identified 
and associated with the problem areas that will increase error potential. In the process of 
incident investigations, PIPs are also studied to establish the underlying causes of error 
for each activity. PIPs are important in the redesign of the process necessary to minimize 
the potential of error and to maximize utility. This can be achieved through effective 
presentation of information in control rooms, or by using clear operating instructions. 
Expert judgments are also applied to clarify the PIPs for different tasks and the causes of 
failure as a part of the HEPs methodology. Application of the expert judgment (Step 4 in 
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Figure 8.2) to investigate the appropriate PIFs required for the specific task has been 
previously used by Embery (6). 
8.3.5 Rate and weights of PIFs 
One of the most important steps m SLIM is to determine the weight of PIFs for 
calculating SLis. Weights are assigned by the same experts who assess the PIFs to 
calculate HEPs. Weights are assessed based on the significance of the PIF based on the 
specific scenario. In this assessment, the PIFs with highest ranks are considered as the 
relevant PIFs, listed in Table 8.3 (Step 5 in Figure 8.2). 
Table 8.3 Ranking of PIFs 
No. PIF Rank 
1 Training 10 
2 Experience 9 
3 Stress 9 
4 Work Memory 8 
5 Physical capability and condition 7 
6 Work environment 6 
7 Access to equipment 5 
8 Distraction 5 
9 Behaviour 4 
10 Fatigue 2 
11 Time pressure 1 
12 Task difficulty (poor design) 1 
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According to five experts (considered in this study) who ranked the possible errors, it was 
observed that the six PIFs demonstrated in Table 8.4 are the most important ones in pre-
and post-maintenance procedure of equipment. 
Table 8.4 PIFs consider in this scenario 
PIF PIF Description 
Training 
Related to an individual's ability to most effectively identify each 
action and perform the necessary actions to complete activities 
Experience Related to how a person will complete the activities successfully 
Stress 
The inability to complete the task successfully due to anxiety and 
pressure 
Related to short and long term memory of the maintenance 
Work Memory 
operators 
Physical capability Related to functional capabilities and the conditions of working 
and condition environment of the operators who maintain the components 
Work Environment 
Related to how operators identified the conditions of the place 
used for maintenance 
The average values of weights for the considered PIFs received from the experts are 
presented in Table 8.5. 
Table 8.5 Weights ofPIFs 
PIF Weight 
Training 0.25 
Experience 0.20 
Work memory 0.15 
Stress 0.15 
Work environment 0.15 
Physical capability and condition 0.10 
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Rating the PIFs is another important step in the SLIM procedure. PIFs are rated based on 
responses collected from questionnaires (Step 6 in Figure 8.2). These questionnaires were 
completed by experts such as maintenance personnel (Step 7 in Figure 8.2). 
By using Equation 1, the data which was gathered from the judges were processed and 
SUs were obtained for each activity (Step 8 in Figure 8.2). Equation 2 is then used to 
calculate the HEP for each task and activity (Step 9 in Figure 8.2). The results are 
presented in Table 8.6. 
Table 8.6 Human error probability 
Activity HEP 
1.0 Prepare work 
1.1 (Area Authority) Prepare work order 2.67E-04 
1.2 Apply for Permit to Work 1.0E-04 
1.3 Perform equipment diagnostics l.OE-04 
1.4 Identify equipment affected and tags used 7.8E-02 
1.5 Perform risk assessment of activity 6.5E-02 
1.6 Check work order and ensure no conflict of operation or other work 4.6E-03 
1.7 Determine and certify required isolations 3.8E-02 
1.8 (Permit to Work Coordinator) Obtain keys and certificates required 2.9E-02 
1.9 (AA) Authorize work 3.8E-03 
1.10 (PTWC) Assign lockout box and give keys to supervisors affected 
1.9E-02 
by isolation 
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1.11 Perform and document initial gas test 2.7E-02 
1.12 Rank fluid contained within component 1.6E-04 
1.13 Determine size of inlet and outlet lines from component 3.5E-03 
1.14 Identify most appropriate isolation method 1.4E-01 
1.15 (OIM) Approve work activity 5.0E-03 
1.16 (Workforce supervisor) Hold toolbox meeting 2.7E-02 
1.17 Place PTW on permit board with copy displayed at work site 1.4E-04 
2.0 
2.1 Check lines for fluid and pressure 3.8E-04 
2.2 Check bleeds/vents for obstruction 8.5E-02 
2.3 Close isolation valves 3.8E-02 
2.4 Lock and tag isolation valves 1.1E-02 
2.5 Depressurize lines 2.9E-01 
2.6 Drain lines 6.0E-02 
2.7 Purge lines 2.1E-02 
2.8 Perform pressure test & isolation leak test 1.6E-03 
2.9 Open all drains of affected equipment possible 2.1E-02 
2.10 Perform mechanical isolation (fit slip plates, disconnect lines, etc.) 1.0E-01 
2.11 Re-pressurize lines 9.3E-03 
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2.12 Isolate, lock and tag motor from control centre 2.9E-02 
2.13 Test motor for power 3.8E-02 
2.14 Revalidate permit with supervisors 6.5E-04 
2.15 Break containment 6.5E-04 
2.16 Continue testing pressure and isolation at intervals 5.0E-03 
3.0 
3.1 Check lines and equipment for obstructions 2.9E-02 
3.2 Remove mechanical isolation/connect lines to component 8.5E-04 
3.3 Remove locks and tags from valves, leaving valves closed 7.1E-04 
4.0 (WFS) Ensure site and equipment left in safe state 2.7E-02 
5.0 (WFS) Return keys & certificates 2.3E-01 
6.0 
6.1 Return lock-out keys 3.5E-02 
6.2 Give worksite authority back to AA 6.0E-02 
6.3 (Supervisors) Document reinstatement 1.7E-04 
7.0 (PTWC & AA) Close Permit to Work 6.5E-04 
8.0 
8.1 Test Pressure 8.5E-03 
8.2 Remove air from lines 4.6E-02 
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8.3 Open valves, fill and test for leaks 1.3E-03 
8.4 Start the component 1.3E-02 
8.3.6 Quantitative risk analysis 
Different approaches are used in risk analysis such as QRA and PSA to identify major 
hazards and risks of potential accident scenarios. These approaches are being applied to 
improve the level of safety in aerospace, nuclear, and chemical process facilities (32-35). 
The result of risk analysis is normally considered by decision-makers safety experts to 
improve the performance of safety measures in a facility to reduce the risk within an 
acceptable range. 
Risk analysis techniques have been integrated into design, inspection, and maintenance 
scheduling of process systems, resulting in risk-based design of safety measures (34-36), 
risk-based design of process systems (35,37) and risk-based inspection and maintenance 
(1 0,38-42). 
To estimate the risk resulting from human error in pre- and post-maintenance procedures 
of process facilities (Steps 10 to 12 in Figure 8.2), a specific section in offshore process 
facility including a pump, a separator, and a valve is considered (Figure 8.3). Among 
several techniques available for accident scenario modeling, ETs have widely been used 
to explore the probability of consequences resulted from an initiating event. Considering 
the initiating event, the occurrence probability of each consequence is calculated based on 
the occurrence/nonoccurrence of a set of events or success/failure of components. 
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It should be noted that since maintenance procedures of components in Figure 8.3 are 
assumed to be performed at different times, while each component is separated and 
isolated from the others, it is not possible to consider all components in an entire accident 
scenario. Thus, the risk assessment is conducted for each component and then the overall 
risk is estimated by adding individual risks. 
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Figure 8.3 Schematic of an offshore process facility including a pump, separators and a 
valve. The components used in this study are enclosed by dashed line. 
To this end, considering the maintenance of each component as the initiating event, the 
ETs are developed (Step 11 in Figure 8.2) for the pump and valve (Figure 8.4), and the 
separator (Figures 8.5), respectively. Based on field studies and expert opinions, the most 
probable accident scenario following a human error in maintenance procedure of the 
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above-mentioned components would be a release of flammable liquid. Meeting an 
ignition source, a pool fire would occur which can be extinguished only if a water 
sprinkler system is activated by a flame/smoke detector. Also, it is worth noting that 
although the ETs of the pump and the valve are similar, both the severity and probability 
of their consequences are different due to the different amounts of respective releases and 
maintenance frequencies. 
Human 
error 
Pump I valve 
maintenance ------l 
Release Ignition Heat/Smoke Water detector sprinkler 
C1 
C2 
C3 
.----- C4 
C5 
C6 
Figure 8.4 Event tree developed for pump and valve maintenance risk analysis 
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Figure 8.5 Event tree developed for separator maintenance risk analysis 
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The probabilities of the top events of the ETs in Figures 8.4 and 8.5 are indicated in Table 
8.7 (43). However, the probability of the first top event, i.e., Human error, can be derived 
using the probabilities of the sub-activities in Table 8.6, assuming that these activities and 
sub-activities are independent, and acting like a series system (the worst-case scenario). 
Thus, the probability of Human error, HEPr, for maintenance procedure of the equipment 
can be calculated using Equation 3 (Step 10 in Figure 8.2): 
II 
HER, = 1- f1 (1-HEI>J 
i = l 
(3) 
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C7 
C8 
C9 
C10 
C11 
C12 
C13 
C14 
C1 5 
C16 
C17 
C18 
C19 
C20 
where HEPi is the probability of each activity (Table 8.6). 
Table 8.7 Probabilities of event tree's top events ( 43) 
Initiating/Top event 
Maintenance frequencies of pump, valve, and separator 
Human error (HEPr) 
Release 
Ignition 
Heat/ smoke detector 
Hydrocarbon detector 
Temperature/ pressure gauge 
Relief valve 
Water sprinkler 
Probability 
0.3, 0.25, and 0.5 
0.8 
0.1 
0.1 
0.01 
0.2 
0.04 
0.02 
0.04 
Applying the probabilities of top events, the probabilities of consequences can be 
calculated for the pump, valve and the separator (Table 8.8). It should be noted that in 
Table 8.8, for C1 to C6, the first values refer to the pump while the second values are for 
the valve. Using the consequence severity matrix (Appendix 8.1), the severity of each 
consequence can be determined (Column 4 of Table 8.8) based on the extent of its 
adverse effects such as causalities, environmental, and property damage. Assigning 
corresponding monetary values to each consequence (column 5 of Table 8.8), the total 
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amount of envisaged risk for the accident scenario can be estimated as $68615 (Step 12 in 
Figure 8.2). 
It is worth noting that in this study, the above-mentioned risk is not further considered in 
the Risk Management process (Steps 13 to 15 in Figure 8.2) aiming at re-designing the 
activities or implementing safety measures to reduce the risk. However, it is evident that 
if the role of human error in pre- and post-maintenance is neglected, the total amount of 
estimated risk is likely to be underestimated at least $68615. 
Table 8.8 Risk analysis of maintenance-induced accidents 
Index Description Probability Severity Damage 
class ($) 
Cl Safe condition 6.00 E-02, 5.00 E-02 1' 1 0,0 
C2 Mishap 2.16 E-01, 1.80 E-01 1' 1 0,0 
C3 Near miss 2.16 E-02, 1.80 E-02 2, 1 5 E+03, 0 
C4 Fire; successful extinguishment of fire, 2.28 E-03, 1.9 E-03 3,2 25 E+04, 
5 E+03 
minor property damage, minor injury 
C5 Fire; unsuccessful extinguishment of 9.5 E-05, 7.92 E-05 5, 3 25 E+06, 
fire; 25 E+04 
major property damage, major injury, 
possibility of death 
C6 Fire; unsuccessful extinguishment of 2.38 E-03, 1.98 E-03 5, 3 25 E+06, 
fire; 25 E+04 
major property damage, major injury, 
possibility of death 
C7 Safe condition 1 E-01 0 
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C8 Mishap 3.75 E-01 0 
C9, Near miss 6.91 E-03, 1.44 E-02 0 
C15 
C10, Release of hydrocarbon; successful 6.14 E-04, 1.28 E-03 2 5 E+03 
C16 control 
of release; no fire 
C11, Release of hydrocarbon; unsuccessful 1.38 E-04, 2.88 E-04 3 25 E+04 
C17 control 
of release; no fire 
Cl2, Fire; successful extinguishment of fire; 1.46 E-05, 3.04 E-05 4 25 E+05 
C18 major property damage, 
multiple major injury 
Cl3, Fire; unsuccessful extinguishment of 6.08 E -07, 1.54 E- 6 25 +0 
C14, fire; major property damage, 07, 7 
C19, major injury, possibility of fatalities 1.27 E-06, 3.2 E-07 
C20 
8.4 Conclusion 
The majority of the tasks in pre- and post-maintenance procedures are currently being 
done by automated systems. Thus, the human error likelihood is expected to be lower. 
The methodology developed in this research can be applied to maintenance procedures of 
any equipment or process facility in onshore and offshore. This could help to better 
investigate the role of HEP in risk analysis and consequently to increase the overall 
reliability and safety of the process system. 
A risk-based methodology is developed to determine the HEPs and applied to the case of 
pre- and post-maintenance procedures in offshore facilities. The results illustrate that 
human error should be considered in risk analyses of process systems as an important 
contributor. Although maintenance procedures are aimed at increasing the reliability and 
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availability of the system, the occurrence of human errors in pre and post-maintenance 
procedures is likely to increase the overall risk. 
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Appendix 8.1 Consequence severity matrix ( 44) 
Dollar 
Severity Environmental Confidence or 
value Asset Loss Human Loss 
Class Loss Reputation Loss 
equivalent 
0 No significant asset Minor mishap, No remediation Get noticed by 
loss No injury required operating unit only 
2 0.01 K -1 0 Short term M inor injury, Around the Get noticed in the 
K production first aid attention operating unit, operation line/ line 
interruption required Easy recovery and supervisor 
remediation 
3 10 K - 500 Equipment damage One injuries Around the Get noticed in plant 
K of one unit requiring requiring hospital operating line, 
repair/medi um term attention Easy recovery and 
production however no remediation 
interruption threat to life 
4 500 K- 5 M Equipment damage More than one Within plant, Get attention in the 
of more than one unit mJunes requmng Short term industrial complex. 
requiring repair/ long hospital attention remediation effort Information shared 
term production however no with neighboring 
interruption threat to I i fe units 
5 5 M - 50M Loss of one operating Multiple major Minor offsite Local media 
unit/ product inj uries, potential impact, coverage 
disabi lities, Remediation cost 
potential threat to will be less than 1 
life mill ion 
6 50 M - 500 Loss of major portion One fatality Community Regional media 
M of equipment/ and/or multiple advisory issued, coverage a brief note 
product inj uries with Remediation cost on national media 
disabilities remain below 5 
million 
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7 > 500M Loss of all 
equipment/ products 
Multiple fatalities Community 
evacuation for 
longer period, 
Remediation cost 
in excess of 5 
million 
National media 
coverage, Brief note 
on international 
media 
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9 Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
9.1 Summary 
The present study developed risk-based methodologies to identify the role of human 
errors in pre and post-maintenance of process facilities and established mechanism to 
reduce their contribution to the risk, different methods of HEPs were reviewed and 
evaluated. Among the existing methods, HEART and SLIM were used to develop 
methodologies .. 
HEART technique was used to calculate the HEP in different scenarios and to identify the 
high-risk activities in pre and post maintenance of a pump. Also the HEART 
methodology was revised to study HEPs and estimate risk in normal and cold conditions. 
SLIM technique was used to calculate the HEPs of the same scenario. To estimate the 
risk, the consequences were also assessed in this methodology. This research focused on 
the importance of considering human error in quantitative risk analyses. Further, the 
SLIM and the THERP were integrated to generate the nominal HEP data when it is 
unavailable. 
9.2 Conclusions 
The main conclusions of this study are as follow: 
9.2.1 Evaluation of Human Error Probability Assessment Techniques 
SLIM is one of the most flexible techniques to obtain performance shaping factors 
from an expert although failing to model the interdependencies among them. HEART, 
on the other hand, is a quick and simple technique to use with little training; however, 
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the reliability of the method is not yet proven. Lack of existing validation studies and 
the method's high dependency on expert opinions are just some of HEART's 
limitations. THEARP is claimed as one of the most precise techniques to determine 
HEP; however, it is not useful for error reduction and is highly dependent on the 
assessors. Therefore, choosing the specific level by the assessors may lead to different 
results. AP J is another technique to make precise estimates of HEP in different fields. 
Likewise, PC can be used to estimate the relative importance of different human 
errors or human events and also to estimate HEPs. However, this method is not 
suitable for complex predictions of human error. 
9.2.2 A new methodology to assess the HEPs in maintenance procedures 
Human reliability analysis for the pre.o.maintenance and post-maintenance activities of a 
pump was analyzed using HEART methodology. The nominal HEP was calculated for 
each activity. According to the results, two activities had high HEPs: "drain lines" and 
"open valves, fill pump and test for leaks." This study identified the high risk activities 
and discussed ways to prevent failure. To reduce the probability of human error, required 
remedial measures were recommended for these activities. Related injuries and fatalities 
could be decreased by optimizing the design and utilizing some of the equipment and 
devices and by selecting more experienced operators, and improving the level of their 
training. 
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9.2.3 Human Error Probability Assessment during the Maintenance Procedures by 
Using an Integrated Method 
An integrated new approach to quantify the human errors occurred m maintenance 
procedures of an offshore condensate pump has been developed. The developed 
methodology solves one of the most important challenges encountered in application of 
THERP, i.e., the availability of nominal HEPs for the considered tasks. Wherever data 
were unavailable; the SLIM has been used to generate the required data. This study 
demonstrated that RFID technology can effectively be applied to minimize the probability 
of human error in the maintenance operation. Although the reduction is not very 
significant in the present case study, the higher degree of HEP reduction may be possible 
depending on the maintenance activity in offshore oil and gas facilities. Application of the 
developed methodology to a considered case study in this research also demonstrates that 
the proposed integration of SLIM in the THERP framework has made the application of 
THERP much quicker and simpler. 
9.2.4 A new methodology to estimate the HEP in harsh and cold environments 
In this study it was illustrated that human performance is adversely affected by harsh and 
cold conditions. The extreme conditions (the extremely cold temperature with high speed 
wind) lead to higher chances of human error in their activities. Extreme conditions affect 
the cognition, physiology, and psychology of personnel. 
In this research, a new methodology is developed to estimate the HEPs in harsh 
environments for a specific task. The results showed the effect of cold on cognitive 
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attributes of people such as attention, decision-making, diagnosis, memory and problem 
solving is significant. This study confirmed that re-evaluation of HEPs is required for any 
scenario that occurs in harsh environments since the HEPs calculated in normal 
conditions are not compatible to a similar scenario in harsh and cold conditions. 
Comparing the human error risks in the normal condition and the cold conditions, it was 
demonstrated that the cognitive category has the highest risk among physical, 
instrumentations, and management. Cognitive impairment increases the HEP and 
subsequently the human error risk. 
9.2.5 Application of Human Error Probability methods in Quantitative Risk 
Analysis 
In this research, a risk-based methodology was developed and applied to determine the 
HEPs in the case of pre- and post-maintenance procedures in offshore facilities. The 
results illustrate that human error should be considered in risk analysis of process systems 
as an important contributor. Although maintenance procedures are aimed at increasing the 
reliability and availability of the system, the occurrence of human errors in pre and post-
maintenance procedures is likely to increase the overall risk. 
9.3 Recommendation 
The present work attempts to introduce new methodologies to assess and include HEP in 
the risk analysis of maintenance procedures in offshore oil and gas industries. This study 
can be further extended as follows.: 
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9.3.1 HEP of entire maintenance procedure 
Since this study was aimed at introducing a new methodology to assess the HEPs, it 
merely focused on the pre and post-maintenance procedures. However, the methodology 
developed in this study can be applied to entire maintenance activities to increase the 
overall reliability of process facilities during maintenance procedures. 
9.3.2 Application and validation of HEP in QRA 
The present study has introduced a new methodology based on application of HEP 
methods in QRA. The methodology developed in this research is mainly based on the 
application of event tree, considering the maintenance as an initiating event. However, it 
is recommended that bow-tie approach be used to model the effect of HEPs not only in 
the consequence analysis but also in the cause analysis of an initiating event. 
9.3.3 Consideration of dependence and HEP updating 
Due to the variation of operational and environmental conditions of process facilities, 
particularly with respect to offshore activities or harsh environments, it is recommended 
that HEPs be updated when new information become available. This updating can be 
performed using Bayesian techniques as operational parameters vary over time and space. 
Bayesian techniques also provide a good opportunity to consider interdependency of 
performance shaping factors in human error probability estimation. Use of Bayesian 
approaches in HEP and human factor risk analysis would improve overall reliability of 
the risk analysis. 
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